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IDENTITY LAWS AND PRIVACY PROTECTION IN A
MODERN STATE: THE LEGAL HISTORY CONCERNING
PERSONAL INFORMATION IN TAIWAN (1895–2015)
Yung-hua Kuo & Po-liang Chen†
Abstract: This article investigates the continuity and transformation of 
the personal identity and identification legal systems in Taiwan.  From 1895 to 2015, 
Japan and subsequently the Republic of China (ROC) ruled Taiwan and transplanted 
different legal systems of personal information to Taiwan.  This article analyzes how 
these systems were applied to and impacted Taiwanese society in three periods: the 
Japanese rule period (1895–1945), the period of strict control by the ROC government 
(1945–1992), and the rise and evolution of the privacy period (1993–2015).
When Taiwan was ruled by the Qing Empire (1683–1895), there was no precise 
personal information database in Taiwan.  After the Sino-Japanese War, in 1895 the Qing 
Dynasty ceded Taiwan to Japan, which spent a ten years using its police to conduct 
surveys to collect person information of all residents in Taiwan.  Based on the survey 
results, Japan established a modern household registration system to govern legal identity 
and identification affairs in Taiwan.  While this personal database facilitated the 
enforcement of public policies, the main purpose of the Japanese household registration 
system was to allow the police to closely monitor the residents in Taiwan.  After World 
War II, the ROC government ruled Taiwan since 1945.  Using the Japanese household 
registration records as a foundation, the ROC government was able to quickly construct 
its own household registration system. Moreover, in order to counter the threats of the 
Communist Party in Mainland China, the ROC government combined the household 
registration system with the police system and issued National Identification Cards 
(National ID Cards) for every Taiwanese adult citizen for mobilization and surveillance.  
The combination of the police and the household registration systems was in effect until
1992.
However, advanced computer technology made fingerprint databases feasible, 
which posed new threats to privacy rights. In 1997, the ROC Legislative Yuan amended 
the Household Registration Act to establish a fingerprint database for strengthening social 
order.  Article 8 of the amended act required all Taiwanese adults to provide their 
fingerprints when they renewed their National ID Cards. This requirement raised heated 
debates on the issue of whether the government’s collection of fingerprints intruded on 
right of privacy.  Responding to such dispute, in 2005 the Constitutional Court struck 
down Article 8 of the Household Registration Act for violating individual privacy rights.
The repeal of the Household Registration Act signified a landmark event for privacy 
protection in Taiwan. After about one hundred years of suppression and surveillance, the 
Taiwanese people ultimately become aware of the value of privacy rights.  Yet, due to the 
threats of terrorism and advanced technology, Taiwan and other countries are facing 
concerns about the collection of information, improvement of national security, and 
† Yung-hua Kuo and Po-liang Chen are Ph.D. students at the University of Washington School of 
Law.  The authors are grateful to the anonymous reviewers and editors for their inspiring and constructive 
suggestions to improve this article.  The authors thank Professor Tay-sheng Wang for his valuable advice to 
the authors and discussions about personal information systems in Taiwan from the legal-historical 
perspective.  The authors also give thanks to Dr. Hsiang-Yang Hsieh for his insights on the evolution of 
privacy rights in the Taiwanese Constitutional Court.  All errors and omissions remain the responsibility of 
the authors.  
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protection of privacy rights.  The Taiwanese people, as well as people around the world, 
must carefully seek to balance these competing interests.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent plans by the Taiwanese Ministry of the Interior to create a new 
version of National Identity Cards (National ID Cards) have re-energized 
privacy debates in Taiwan. These plans would replace the current National 
ID Cards with a new type of card incorporating drivers’ licenses, health 
insurance cards, e-purses, tax statements, e-voting, and other functions. 1
While the Ministry of the Interior proposed that equipping cards with a
variety of personal information may allow them to serve multiple functions, 
ministry officials were hesitant to publicize and promptly enforce this plan.2
After several newspapers briefly reported on the plan, a few members of
Taiwanese society, especially legal scholars, made note of the plan and 
analyzed its potential impacts.3 But the majority of Taiwanese people paid 
little attention to the reports concerning the Ministry’s plan.4 To explain the 
complexity surrounding the identity legal systems in Taiwan, this article 
aims to clarify the history of personal information legal systems in Taiwan.
Specifically, this article poses the following questions regarding the use of
personal information in a modern state while considering the particular 
history of Taiwan:  what types of legal systems governing personal 
information have existed in Taiwan during the past one hundred years? 
How have the legal systems shaped the Taiwanese society? Does the 
1 See Chen Yu-hsin (昛暐搓), Jingpian Shenfenzheng Neizhengbu:  Youxian Zhenghe Shenfenzheng 
Jiazhao yu Jianbaoka (㘞䇯幓↮嫱–ℏ㓧悐烉⃒⃰㔜⎰幓↮嫱ˣ楽䄏冯‍ᾅ⌉) [Ministry of Interior: 
Priority Will Be Given to Incorporating National IDs, Driver’s Licenses, and Health Insurance Cards onto 
One Smart Chip Card], [LIANHE XINWEN WANG] (倗⎰㕘倆䵚) [UNITED DAILY NEWS] (May 11, 2015), 
http://money.udn.com/money/story/5648/894319-㘞䇯幓↮嫱-ℏ㓧悐烉⃒⃰㔜⎰幓↮嫱ˣ楽䄏冯‍ᾅ
⌉.
2 See Ministry of the Interior, ROC (Taiwan), Neizhengbu Jingpian Shenfenzheng Yanmi Guihua 
Baohu Geren Ziliao Anquanxing ji Yinsi (ℏ㓧悐㘞䇯幓↮嫱♜⭮夷∫ᾅ嬟ᾳṢ屯㕁⬱ℐ⿏⍲晙䥩)
[Ministry of the Interior: Smart Cards with Chips are Well Designed to Protect Personal Information 
Security and Privacy], Nei zhengbu ( ℏ 㓧 悐 ) [MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR],
http://www.moi.gov.tw/chi/chi_news/news_ detail.aspx?sn=9469&type_code=02 (last visited Feb. 20, 
2016); Wen Gui-xiang (㹓屜楁), Jingpian Shenfenzheng Neizhengbu: Bu Maoran Shishi (㘞䇯幓↮嫱 ℏ
㓧悐烉ᶵ屧䃞⮎㕥) [Ministry of the Interior: No Hasty Enforcement of Smart Cards with Chips], 
Zhongyang Tongxunshe ( ᷕ ⣖ 忂 妲 䣦 ) [CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY] (May 11, 2015),
http://www.cna.com.tw/news/firstnews/201505110061-1.aspx.
3 See id.; Huang Yang-ming (湫㎂㖶), Shenfenzheng duoheyi? Neizhengbu: Xian zhenghe jiazhao 
Jianbaoka (幓↮嫱⣂⎰ᶨ烎 ℏ㓧悐烉⃰㔜⎰楽䄏ˣ‍ᾅ⌉) [Incorporating Multiple Cards into One 
National ID Card? Ministry of Interior: Driver’s Licenses and Health Insurance Cards Will Be 
Incorporated First], PINGGUO JISHI XINWEN (喳㝄㖍⟙ ) [APPLE DAILY NEWS] (May 11, 2015),
http://www.appledaily.com.tw/ realtimenews/article/new/20150511/607912/.
4 See id.
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development of such legal systems in Taiwan provide any guidance about 
the value of privacy rights and state power for the future?
In order to answer these questions, this article will investigate
Taiwan’s history concerning personal identity and identification legal 
systems from 1895 to 2015, which is divided into three periods and 
discussed in the following three Parts. Following the Introduction, the
Second Part discusses the history of personal information legal system in the 
Japanese rule period (1895–1945), during which the Empire of Japan (Japan)
spent ten years establishing the first rigorous household registration legal 
system in Taiwan. The Third and Fourth Parts then discuss laws governing
personal information in Taiwan during the Republic of China (ROC) rule 
period. The Third Part illustrates the household registration system and the 
National ID Cards system under the authoritarian ROC government (1945–
1992). The Fourth Part illustrates the transition of the Household 
Registration Act from an authoritarian regime to democracy and its 
challenges. The Fifth Part focuses on the constitutional debate over the use 
of National ID Cards, the fingerprints database, and privacy rights in the 
information age (1992–2015). Based on the history of legal systems 
concerning personal information in these three phases, the Fifth Part 
analyzes the interaction between personal information, privacy rights, state 
power, and social order.  The Sixth Part concludes this article in finding that 
democracy is necessary but not sufficient to bring about the protection and 
effective realization of privacy rights.
II. JAPANESE RULE PERIOD (1895–1945)
A. Background: Incomplete and Imprecise Records of Taiwanese 
Residents 
Before Japan’s rule from 1895 to 1945, Taiwan was ruled by the Qing
Empire from 1683 to 1895, during which the Qing government collected
limited personal information from residents in Taiwan. The Qing
government only surveyed and accumulated information of male adults over 
the age of sixteen, using those personal information records to impose a tax 
and corvée (labor in lieu of a tax) on them for the purpose of public works.
The Qing government refrained from collecting personal information from 
people not producing revenue, including children and women.5 Moreover, 
5 See Hou Chia-chu (ὗ⭞楺), Woguo Lidai Liyi Hushui Ji Zashui (ㆹ⚳㬟ẋ≃⼡ˣ㇞䦭⍲暄䦭)
[The Corvée, Household Tax, and Miscellaneous Tax in China throughout History], 17(8) TAIPEI 
SHIZHENG YUEKAN (⎘⊿ⶪ㓧㚰↲) [TAIPEI MUN. ADMIN. MONTHLY] 1, 3, 7 (1986).
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due to a lack of strict control and regular updates to the records on
Taiwanese residents, the Qing government did not gather complete and 
precise personal information for most residents in Taiwan. For example, 
illegal immigrants from Mainland China in Taiwan attempted to use the 
incomplete coverage to hide from governmental inspection, and some 
Taiwanese households would report fewer family members for tax evasion
purposes.6 It was estimated that by the early eighteenth century, the Qing
government officially recorded only one-tenth of people actually residing in 
Taiwan.7 In other words, the Qing government failed to collect personal 
information for the large majority of Taiwanese residents.
At the end of the nineteenth century, Japan took power in Taiwan and 
gradually established the first modern legal system governing personal 
information of all Taiwanese people.  In 1895, Japan defeated the Qing
Empire in the Sino-Japanese War. Both countries then signed the Treaty of 
Shimonoseki, under which the Qing Empire ceded Taiwan to Japan. From 
that point on, the Japanese government attempted to realize the social, 
economic, geographical, and cultural potential of Taiwan in ruling the new 
colony. The Japanese government required detailed information about
Taiwan in order to achieve effective control and make proper policies based 
on the actual conditions in Taiwan, including the personal information of the
Taiwanese population and individuals.
Yet, during the process of investigating and collecting information 
from the Taiwanese population, the Japanese government immediately
encountered significant difficulties.  Within the first nine months of ruling 
Taiwan, the Government-General of Taiwan (7DLZDQ6ǀtokufu), the highest 
department of Japanese government in Taiwan, conducted three surveys to 
gather personal information and engaged in a systematic search and seizure 
of weapons. In July 1895, Japanese military police conducted the first 
6 See TAIPEI SHIZHI, VOL. III, ZHENGZHI ZHI HUZHENG PIAN (⎘⊿ⶪ⽿ ⌟ᶱ㓧⇞⽿㇞㓧䭯)
[TAIPEI CITY HISTORY, VOL. III HISTORY OF INSTITUTIONS: HOUSEHOLD SYSTEM] 48 (Wang Guo-fan (䌳
⚳䑈) et al. eds., 1977); TAIWAN SHENG TONGZHIGAO, VOL. II RENMIN ZHI RENKOU PIAN (⎘䀋䚩忂⽿䧧
⌟ḴṢ㮹⽿Ṣ⎋䭯) [THE HISTORY OF TAIWAN PROVINCE, VOL. II HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE: POPULATION]
2 (Chen Shao-hsin (昛䳡楐) ed., 1964).
7 See Ino Kanori (Ẳ傥▱䞑 ), 7DLZDQ 1L 2NHUX .RNǀ +HQ-shin (⎘䀋̬㕤̒͌㇞⎋䶐⮑ )
[Compilation and Examination of Household Registration in Taiwan] 4(11) TAIWAN KANSHǋKIJI (⎘䀋ㄋ
佺姀ḳ) [RECORDS OF TAIWANESE CUSTOMS] 31, 31–34 (1904).
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survey in part of Taipei Town8 to gather basic information about the people 
in each household, including name, age, occupation, and place of birth.9
Two months later, as more Japanese police were assigned to Taiwan, 
the police replaced the military to conduct two increasingly comprehensive 
surveys in Taiwan.10 In the second survey, conducted in September 1985, 
the Japanese police gathered the personal information of every household in 
Taipei Town. 11 The police forced Taiwanese people to submit their 
personal information, including name, place of birth, address, types of 
residence (public, private, or rental property), appellation of each family 
member, and occupation to the police. 12 Moreover, in order to collect 
personal information outside of Taipei Town, in February 1896 the 
Government-General of Taiwan undertook a third survey covering the 
entirety of the Taiwanese island.13 However, as the government gradually 
expanded the scope of each survey, it faced serious resistance stemming 
from Taiwanese residents attempting to hide or refusing to provide personal 
information. The ultimate failure of the surveys to collect the 
comprehensive data sought by the Government-General of Taiwan, as well 
as the search and seizure of weapons, resulted from language barriers,
cultural differences, and Taiwanese citizens’ distrust of the police force of 
the new ruler.14
B. Toward a Rigorous Personal Information System Governed by the 
Police
Upon encountering strong resistance from the Taiwanese people, the 
Taiwan Government-General decided to incorporate the traditional Chinese 
Baojia ( ᾅ 䓚 ) system into the Japanese police system to more 
comprehensively monitor and control Taiwanese society. The Qing Empire 
had implemented the Baojia system in Taiwan prior to Japan gaining control,
8 Taipei Town was the castle town where the Taipei prefecture of the Qing government was situated.  
It was located between Dadaocheng and Wanhua in today’s Taipei City.   
9 See TAIWAN ZONGDU FU JINGWU JU (⎘䀋䷥䜋⹄嬎⊁⯨) [POLICE BUREAU, GOVERNMENT-
GENERAL OF TAIWAN], TAIWAN Sƿ72.8)8JINGCHA YANGE ZHI, VOL. II (⎘䀋䷥䜋⹄嬎⮇㱧朑娴炷Ḵ))
[THE HISTORY OF THE POLICE OF THE TAIWAN GOVERNOR-GENERAL’S OFFICE, VOL. II] 654–55 (1933); 
ABE YURIKA (旧悐䓙䎮楁), RI ZHI SHIQI TAIWAN HUKOU ZHIDU ZHI YANJIU (㖍㱣㗪㛇⎘䀋㇞⎋⇞⹎ᷳ
䞼䨞) [FORMATION OF HOUSEHOLD REGISTRATION IN TAIWAN DURING THE JAPANESE PERIOD] 21 (2001).
10 See POLICE BUREAU, GOVERNMENT-GENERAL OF TAIWAN, supra note 9, at 655–58.
11 Id. at 655–57.
12 See id.
13 See id. at 658.
14 See id. at 654–58.
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under which ten households constituted one Pai (䇴), ten Pai constituted one 
Bao (ᾅ), and ten Bao constituted one Jia (䓚). 15 This Baojia system 
required people in the same Bao or Jia to help other members when 
incidents happened, and to report any crimes that occurred within that unit to 
the government.16 In addition, if any members of the unit changed their 
personal status, such as marriage or birth, they were required to duly report 
to the head of their Bao and Jia, who in turn reported to the government.17
Although the Baojia system was not perfectly enforced throughout Taiwan,
the Qing government nonetheless collected a significant amount of personal 
information to maintain social order.
After the Japanese government gained control of Taiwan and 
gradually strengthened its hold on the island, various individuals and groups 
of Taiwanese people who opposed the government attempted to hide from 
the surveys and searched for opportunities to attack the Japanese 
government. In order to suppress these opposition groups, in 1898 the 
Taiwan Government-General issued the Regulation of Baojia System (Baojia
-ǀUHL), which modified the existing Baojia system in Taiwan into an
intermediate mechanism with which the Japanese police could penetrate 
more deeply into local communities.18 Similarly to the Baojia system, the 
Baojia -ǀUHL system created by Japan required Taiwanese people to 
promptly report any change of their personal status to police via the heads of 
their Bao and Jia.19 Also, members of a Bao or Jia were required to report 
any crimes and suspected criminals within their Bao or Jia, especially 
opponents of Japanese authority. Yet, in contrast to the Baojia, the new 
Japanese Baojia -ǀUHL system delegated a degree of state power and public 
duties to the heads of Bao and Jia, thereby requiring that leaders of local 
Taiwanese communities assist the Japanese police in monitoring and 
controlling their fellow citizens. The mandatory duties assigned to the heads 
included observing every event within their units and reporting to the
15 See TAI YEN-HUI (㇜䀶廅), QUINGDAI TAIWAN ZHI XIANGZHI (㶭ẋ⎘䀋ᷳ悱㱣) [THE VILLAGE 
GOVERNANCE IN TAIWAN UNDER QING RULE] 233–34 (1979).
16 See LIAN HENG (忋㨓), TAIWAN TONGSHI, VOL. II (⎘䀋忂⎚ ᶳℲ) [GENERAL HISTORY OF 
TAIWAN, VOL. II] 428 (Chung Hwa Tsung-su Committee (ᷕ厗⎊㚠⥼⒉㚫) ed., 1955).
17 See TAI YEN-HUI, supra note 15, at 79, 84.
18 See LIOU WEI-JER (∱䵕⒚), TAIWAN YUANZHUMIN SHENFEN RENDING BIANGE YIANSU ZHI 
TANTAO (⎘䀋⍇ỷ㮹幓↮娵⭂嬲朑⚈䳈ᷳ㍊妶) [A STUDY ON THE CHANGES IN THE REGULATION OF 
INDIGENOUS STATUS] 36 (2006).
19 See ZHENG SHU-PIN (惕㵹⯷), TAIWAN ZAI RIJU SHIQI JINGCHA FALING YU FANZUI KONGZHI (⎘
䀋⛐㖍㒂㗪㛇嬎⮇㱽Ẍ冯䉗伒㍏⇞) [THE POLICE REGULATIONS AND CRIMINAL CONTROL IN TAIWAN 
DURING JAPANESE RULE PERIOD] 58, 91 (1986).
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supervising police department.20 Through the Baojia -ǀUHL system, Japanese 
police accumulated extensive records of the personal information of 
Taiwanese people.
As the Japanese police successfully collected extensive information 
from Taiwanese residents, the police simultaneously strengthened the 
government’s position in collecting and updating personal information in 
Taiwan. In 1903 the Taiwan Government-General issued the Regulation of 
Investigation on Households (.RNǀ &KǀVD Kitei), which authorized the 
police, with the assistance of the Baojia system, to frequently check the
status, occupation, activities, moral behaviors, and living conditions of a
household’s members. 21 In June 1905, the Taiwan Government-General 
issued the Regulation of Temporary Investigation on Households (Rinji 
7DLZDQ.RNǀ&KǀVD Kisoku) to grant the police authority to carry out the 
first census of the entire island of Taiwan. While conducting the census, the 
police collected very broad and detailed personal information from all of 
Taiwan’s residents,22 except for Taiwanese indigenous people.23 The police 
recorded twenty-two types of personal information, including name, 
relationship with the head of household, race, sex, date of birth, address, 
marriage, type of main occupation and position, type of side occupation and 
position, frequently-used language, other language ability, level of education, 
type and cause of any disability, usage of opium, foot-binding, place of birth 
and domicile (only for Japanese people from Japanese proper), year of 
arrival in Taiwan (only for Japanese people from Japanese proper), 
20 See Chiang Ch’ing-lin (㰇ㄞ㜿 ), Riju Shiqi Taiwan zhi Jingzhi:  Yi Eryu Yuantailang zhi 
Jingzheng Gaige Wei Zhongxin (㖍㒂㗪㛇⎘䀋ᷳ嬎⇞—ẍ⃺䌱㸸⣒恶ᷳ嬎㓧㓡朑䁢ᷕ⽫) [Taiwanese 
Police System in Japanese Rule Period: Focusing on the Reform of Police Administration by Kodama 
*HQWDUǀ], in TAIWAN SHENG WENXIAN WEIYUANHUI CHENGLI SISHI ZHOUNIAN JINIAN ZHUANJI, (⎘䀋䚩
㔯䌣⥼⒉㚫ㆸ䩳⚃⋩忙⸜䲨⾝⮰廗) [SPECIAL VOLUME OF THE FORTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF TAIWAN 
HISTORICA] 32–34 (1988).
21 See .RNǀ&KǀVD.LWHL6HLWHL+DSSX1R.HQ㇞⎋婧㞍夷䦳䘤ⶫΆẞ) [The Issue of Regulation 
of Investigation on Households], TAIWAN ZONGDU FU GONGWEN LEIZUAN Vol. 854 No. 2 (⎘䀋䷥䜋⹄℔
㔯栆个) [OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS OF TAIWAN GOVERNMENT-GENERAL] (1903).
22 See TAIWAN ZONGDUFU GUANFANG TONGJIKE ( ⎘ 䀋 ䷥ 䜋 ⹄ ⭀ ㇧ 䴙 妰 婚 ) [TAIWAN 
GOVERNMENT-GENERAL, STATISTICS DIVISION], MINGZHI SANSHIBA NIAN LINSHI TAIWAN HANYI HUKOU 
DIAOCHA JISHU BAOWEN] (㖶㱣ᶱ⋩ℓ⸜冐㗪冢䀋㻊嬗㇞⎋婧㞍姀徘⟙㔯) [THE CHINESE EDITION 
REPORTS OF TEMPORARY INVESTIGATION ON HOUSEHOLDS IN TAIWAN IN MEIJI 38] 7–12, 16 (1909).
23 During the Japanese rule period, the Japanese government applied special regulations and policies 
to Taiwanese indigenous people, which differed from those applied to other residents in Taiwan such as 
Han Chinese and Japanese people. 
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nationality (only for foreigners), and temporary residence (only for people 
who were temporarily living in Taiwan).24
The two new regulations recognized the Japanese police as the 
authority responsible for administering the household registration systems in 
Taiwan after their extensive collection and management efforts. Through 
the census, the police helped the Japanese government both update the 
official personal information records concerning the Taiwanese people and 
expand the breadth and depth of the information collected. Because of the 
census, the Japan government gained complete control over the personal 
information of the Taiwanese people. Thus, in December 1905, six months 
after the census, the Taiwan Government-General issued the Regulation on 
Household Registration (.RNǀKisoku) to formally appoint the police as the 
exclusive authority governing personal information in Taiwan. The 
registration confirmed the validity of the personal information records held 
by police agencies, abolishing the records in other departments.25 Thus,
Japan established the first rigorous legal system governing precise personal 
information in Taiwan after it had spent roughly ten years gathering, 
updating, and using personal information from people in Taiwan.
III. THE PERIOD OF STRICT CONTROL BY THE ROC GOVERNMENT (1945–
1992)
A. The Rapid Establishment of the ROC Household Registration Legal 
System
In 1945, after Japan was defeated in the Second World War, the ROC 
government took over Taiwan and quickly reestablished a rigorous 
household registration legal system. After the Japanese government and its 
officials retreated from Taiwan, the Taiwan Provincial Administration 
Office—the highest governing authority in Taiwan within the ROC 
government—and the county and the municipal governments obtained the 
materials left by the previous regime, including official records of personal 
information of Taiwanese residents. 26 Based on these documents, the 
24 See TAIWAN GOVERNMENT-GENERAL, STATISTICS DIVISION, supra note 22, at 7–8.
25 See .RNǀ.LVRNX2\REL.RNǀ&KǀVD.LWHL6HLWHL1R.HQ㇞⎋夷⇯⍲㇞⎋婧㞍夷䦳⇞⭂Άẞ)
[The Enactment of Regulation on Household Registration and Regulation of Investigation on Households], 
TAIWAN ZONGDU FU GONGWEN LEIZUAN Vol. 1062 No. 9 (⎘䀋䷥䜋⹄℔㔯栆个) [OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS 
OF TAIWAN GOVERNMENT-GENERAL] (1905).
26 See TAIWAN XINSHENG BAOSHE CONGSHU BIANZUAN WEIYUANHUI (冢䀋㕘䓇⟙䣦⎊㚠䶐个⥼
⒉㚫) [DAILY NEWS COLLECTIONS EDITORIAL BOARD], TAIWAN NIANJIAN (⎘䀋⸜揹) [TAIWAN ALMANAC]
F40, F48 (1947)
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Taiwan Provincial Administration Office conducted a census of the 
population in Taiwan. The Office collected and verified the personal 
information of all Taiwanese residents in a three-month period from April to 
June of 1946.27 Following the census, the household registration offices of 
county and municipal governments also completed the first “initial 
household registration” of all Taiwanese residents from July 1946 to 
February 1947.28
Compared to the Japanese government, which spent almost ten years 
establishing the first household registration system in Taiwan, the ROC 
government only spent about one year reviewing and rechecking the 
personal information of all Taiwanese residents and reestablishing a 
household registration system. While the ROC government did not have 
more administrative resources than the Japanese government to collect 
information, the ROC government could establish its household registration 
system at a relatively fast pace based on the personal information collected 
by the previous Japanese regime.
The ROC government efficiently collected personal information and 
quickly reestablished a household registration system in Taiwan through the 
use of the extensive data previously collected and lessons learned from the
Japanese. In fact, after the war, the ROC government and its household 
registration offices suffered from a serious lack of officials.29 Even with
such limited resources, the household registration offices in the Taiwan 
Provincial Administration Office and the county and municipal governments
completed the census and the first “initial household registration” of all 
Taiwanese residents in a relatively short period. While the Japanese 
government had to gather and correct personal information from each 
27 See id. at I41–I43; TAIWAN SHENG XINGZHENG ZHANGGUAN GONGSHU (⎘䀋䚩埴㓧攟⭀℔会)
[TAIWAN PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION OFFICE], ZHONGHUA MINGUO DI SANSHILIU NIANDU TAIWAN 
SHENG XINGZHENG ZHANGGUAN GONGSHU GONGZUO JIHUA (ᷕ厗㮹⚳䫔ᶱ⋩ℕ⸜⹎冢䀋䚩埴㓧攟⭀℔
会ⶍἄ妰∫) [THE WORKING AGENDA OF THE GOVERNMENT-GENERAL OF TAIWAN IN 1947] 56–57 (1947)
[hereinafter WORKING AGENDA OF THE GOVERNMENT-GENERAL OF TAIWAN IN 1947]; TAIWAN SHENG 
XINGZHENG ZHANGGUAN GONGSHU JINGWU CHU (⎘䀋䚩埴㓧攟⭀℔会嬎⊁嗽) [THE POLICE FORCE,
TAIWAN PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION OFFICE], TAIWAN YINIAN LAI ZHI JINGWU (⎘䀋ᶨ⸜Ἦᷳ嬎⊁)
[THE RECORDS OF POLICE AFFAIRS IN TAIWAN FROM 1945 TO 1946] 75–76 (1946); GUOSHI GUAN (⚳⎚棐)
[ACADEMIA HISTORICA], TAIWAN SHENG ZHENGFU DANGAN SHILIAO HUIBIAN—TAIWAN SHENG 
XINGZHENG ZHANGGUAN GONGSHU SHIQI, VOL. II (冢䀋䚩㓧⹄㨼㟰⎚㕁⼁䶐—冢䀋䚩埴㓧攟⭀℔会㗪
㛇炷Ḵ炸) [THE COLLECTION OF THE TAIWAN PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT’S DOCUMENTS IN THE TAIWAN 
PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION OFFICE PERIOD, VOL. II] 90–91, 164 (Yueh-Shuen Hsueh (啃㚰枮䶐) ed., 
1998).
28 See DAILY NEWS COLLECTIONS EDITORIAL BOARD, supra note 26, at I41.
29 See WORKING AGENDA OF THE GOVERNMENT-GENERAL OF TAIWAN IN 1947, supra note 27, at 56.
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Taiwanese resident through its own efforts, the ROC government received
vast amounts of well-organized personal information on Taiwanese residents
from the Japanese government. Using the existing data as a foundation, the 
ROC government could examine the data and quickly establish its own 
rigorous household registration legal system in Taiwan.
B. The Combination of the Household Registration System and the 
Police System
Since 1945, the ROC government has gradually replaced the 
Japanese laws with the ROC legal system in Taiwan. On July 23, 1946, the 
Taiwan Provincial Administration Office abolished the Japanese laws 
governing household registration affairs such as the Regulation on 
Household Registration, and enacted the ROC Household Registration Act
(㇞䯵㱽) in Taiwan.30 This system differed from the household registration 
system that was operated by the police in the Japanese rule period in that the 
ROC household registration system was operated by special personnel of the 
household registration offices.31
In addition to the different rules of the ROC Household Registration 
Act, in practice the ROC government and its officials were keenly aware of 
the distinction between a household registration system and a police system.
For example, in 1946, the Taiwan Provincial Police Administration of the 
Taiwan Provincial Administration Office declared that household 
registration system and police system have different functions and purposes:  
household registration was for identification and authentication of identity of 
30 See Feizhi Riben Zhanling Shidai Suo Ban Hukou Guize deng Fagui (⺊㬊㖍㛔Ỽ柀㗪ẋ㇨枺㇞
⎋夷⇯䫱㱽夷) [Annulment of Household Rule and Its Related Regulations Enacted in the Japanese 
Occupation Period], in XINGZHENG ZHANGGUAN GONGSHU DANG-AN (埴㓧攟⭀℔会㨼㟰 ) [THE 
DOCUMENTS OF TAIWAN PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION OFFICE] (July 15–16, 1946),
http://ds2.th.gov.tw/ds3/app003/list3.php?ID1=00307370019001; Feizhi Ri Zhanling Taiwan Shi Suo 
Banxing Hukou deng Fagui Gonggao An (⺊㬊㖍Ỽ柀冢䀋㗪㇨枺埴㇞⎋䫱㱽夷℔⏲㟰 ) [The 
Declaration of Annulment of Household Rule and Its Related Regulations Enacted in the Japanese 
Occupation Period] in XINGZHENG ZHANGGUAN GONGSHU DANG-AN (埴㓧攟⭀℔会㨼㟰 ) [THE 
DOCUMENTS OF TAIWAN PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION OFFICE] (July 17–23, 1946); WANG TAY-SHENG 
(䌳㲘⋯), Taiwan Zhanhou Chuqi de Zhengquan Zhuanti yu Falu Tixi de Chengjie (1945-1949) (⎘䀋㇘⼴
⇅㛇䘬㓧㪲廱㚧冯㱽⼳橼䲣䘬㈧㍍ (ᶨḅ⚃Ḽ军ᶨḅ⚃ḅ)) [The Transition of Legal Systems in the 
Early Period of Postwar Taiwan, 1945–1949], 29.1 NAT’L TAIWAN U.L. REV., 1, 15–16 (1999).
31 See DAILY NEWS COLLECTIONS EDITORIAL BOARD, supra note 26, at F40.
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each Taiwanese person, while police forces were responsible for the pursuit 
of social order and crime prevention.32
Despite the ROC government’s acknowledgement of the distinct 
purposes of the household registration system and police force, in practice 
separating the two functions proved difficult. While the ROC government 
did clearly articulate distinction between the two systems, for the purpose of 
resisting the Communist Party in Mainland China, the ROC government 
passed or amended laws to blur the distinction.33 The ROC government first 
connected the household registration offices and police departments, and 
gradually combined the two systems to monitor every person and detect any 
Communist Party spies.
During the long period of National Mobilization in Suppression of 
Communist Rebellion from 1948 to 1991, the ROC government chose to 
incorporate the household registration system into the police system in order 
to surveil and control the Taiwanese people. Specifically, in 1949 the ROC 
government evacuated to Taiwan when it was defeated by the Chinese 
Community Party in Mainland China. Since 1948, prior to its complete loss 
in the civil war, the ROC government had declared and amended the 
Temporary Provisions During the Period of National Mobilization for 
Suppression of the Communist Rebellion and other special laws to adjust its
government organizations, public policies, and legal systems to counter the 
threats of the Chinese Communist Party.34 One of the proposed adjustments
was the integration of household registration system into the police system,
which allowed the government to more comprehensively and easily integrate 
and analyze data pertaining to the status and activities of each Taiwanese 
person from different governmental departments.35
32 See WORKING AGENDA OF THE GOVERNMENT-GENERAL OF TAIWAN IN 1947, supra note 27, at 75–
76.
33 See, e.g., Enforcement Rules of the Household Registration Act, art. 5 (1946); Regulation of the 
Connection between Household Registration Departments and Police Departments in Counties and Cities 
of Taiwan Province to Check and Record Changes of Households, arts.4–6, 8, (1946).
34 See Temporary Provisions During the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the 
Communist Rebellion, arts. 1–2 (1948); Temporary Provisions During the Period of National Mobilization 
for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion, arts. 1–5 (1960); Temporary Provisions During the Period of 
National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion, arts. 1–6 (Feb. 1966); Temporary 
Provisions During the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion, arts. 
1–8 (Mar. 1966); Temporary Provisions During the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the 
Communist Rebellion, arts. 1–9 (1972); Temporary Provisions During the Period of National Mobilization 
for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion, arts. 1–9 (1991).
35 See Ku Tien-chi (⎌⤈➢), Lun Zongdongyuan yu “Hujing Heyi” (婾䷥≽⒉冯ˬ㇞嬎⎰ᶨ)
[Discussing General Mobilization and the Combination of the Household Registration System and the 
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Beginning in 1953, the Taiwan Provincial Government issued a series 
of regulations—including the Experimental Regulation for Cataloging
Household Registration in Taiwan Province (⎘䀋䚩㔜䎮㇞䯵⮎槿彎㱽),
the Regulation for Improving the Examination on Household Registration in 
Taiwan Province (㓡忚⎘䀋䚩㇞⎋㞍姀彎㱽), and the Regulation for 
Connection between Household Registration and Police Systems in Taiwan 
Region (⎘䀋⛘⋨㇞嬎倗专彎㱽)—to create a dual system of household 
registration offices and police departments that worked cooperatively.36
Within the dual system, household registration offices took charge of 
household registration system administration, and the police departments 
physically checked and updated information and status of Taiwanese 
individuals. In addition, under the new regulations, the Taiwan Provincial 
Government set up joint operation offices for household registration 
personnel and police to work in the same space, which allowed the groups to
easily access and share the personal information collected by the household 
registration system. The government also appointed officials from one 
system to serve as vice directors in organizations of the other system.37
By the end of the 1960s, the ROC government had completely merged
the household registration system and police system. The combination of 
the two systems allowed the government to use personal information data to 
monitor and control Taiwanese citizens to a remarkable degree. While the 
Household Registration Act still kept the household registration system 
distinct from other systems, such as the police system, in May 1969, the 
Executive Yuan, the executive branch of the central government of ROC, 
issued the Regulation of Improving Household Registration System in 
Taiwan During the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the 
Communist Rebellion (≽⒉㇉Ḫ㗪㛇⎘䀋⛘⋨㇞㓧㓡忚彎㱽 ) to 
Police System”], 4(3) ZHONGGUO DIFANG ZIZHI (ᷕ⚳⛘㕡冒㱣) [CHINA SELF-GOV’T REV.] 11, 11–12 
(1955); Kuo Ch'ao-lung (悕㛅昮), Tan Hujifa zhi Xiuzheng Yaoyi ji Dangqian Huzheng shang zhi Wenti
(婯㇞䯵㱽ᷳᾖ㬋天佑⍲䔞⇵㇞㓧ᶲᷳ⓷柴) [Discussion of the Principal Meaning of the Amendment of 
the Household Registration Act and Questions about the Present Household Registration Practice], 26(8) 
ZHONGGUO DIFANG ZIZHI (ᷕ⚳⛘㕡冒㱣) [CHINA SELF-GOV’T REV.] 6, 6 (1973).
36 See Experimental Regulation for Cataloging of Household Registration in Taiwan Province, arts. 
3–8 (1953); Regulation for Improving the Examination on Household Registration in Taiwan Province, arts. 
2, 4, 7, 8 (1965); Regulation for Connection between Household Registration and Police Systems in 
Taiwan Region, arts. 2–11 (1966).
37 See Chang Erh-chang (⻝䇦䐳), Kaiguo Liushi Nian zhi Huzheng (攳⚳ℕ⋩⸜ᷳ㇞㓧) [The 
Administration of the Household Registration System: Sixty Years Since the Establishment of the Republic 
of China], 24(5)–(6) ZHONGGUO DIFANG ZIZHI (ᷕ⚳⛘㕡冒㱣) [CHINA SELF-GOV’T REV.] 48, 52–54 
(1971).
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experiment with a temporary combination of the household registration 
system and the police system in Taiwan for one year.38 Effective from July 
1, 1969, the regulation integrated the two systems in provincial and county 
governments as well as municipal and township offices. In provincial and 
county governments, the household registration offices were moved into the 
police system. In municipal and township household registration offices, the 
household registration operation were under the police’s charge by assigning 
police officials to positions of vice directors to manage household 
registration officials. 39 As a result, the police could access all personal 
information collected through the household registration system.  The police 
could use the information without any restrictions to determine the status 
and situation of Taiwanese individuals. This authority was justified on the 
grounds that the governments needed the information to detect spies and 
prevent crimes in Taiwanese society.
After the trial year, the ROC government extended the regulation’s 
effectiveness trial period of implementing the regulation for several times,
continuing to enforce the combination of household registration system and 
police system without authorization from the Household Registration Act for 
more than a decade. 40 The Household Registration Act did not legally 
combine the two systems until it was amended by the Legislative Yuan in 
1973.  The amended Act not only allowed the police to use personal 
information accumulated by the household registration system to strengthen 
social order, but also strengthened the combination of the two systems.
Specifically, like the household registration offices in provincial and county 
governments, the household registration departments in municipal and 
township offices were completely integrated into the police system. In 
addition, police officials became directors—not vice directors—of the 
38 See Regulation of Improving the Household Registration System in Taiwan During the Period of 
National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion, arts. 2–6, 8, 9, 12 (1969).
39 See Yang Ching-chiang (㣲㶭㰇), Hujing Heyi Zhidu de Gainian (㇞嬎⎰ᶨ⇞⹎䘬㤪⾝) [The 
Concept of Combination of the Household Registration System and the Police System], 9(2) JINGXUE 
CONGKAN (嬎⬠⎊↲) [POLICE SCI. Q.] 94, 94–97 (1978); Yang Ching-chiang (㣲㶭㰇), Hujing Heyi 
Shishi Fangan Zhixing Gaikuang de Jiantao (㇞嬎⎰ᶨ⮎㕥㕡㟰➟埴㤪㱩䘬㩊妶) [A Review of the 
Combination of the Household Registration System and the Police System and Its Practice], 9(4) JINGXUE 
CONGKAN (嬎⬠⎊↲) [POLICE SCI. Q.] 52, 52–53 (1979) [hereinafter Yang Ching-chiang, A Review of the 
Combination of the Household Registration System and the Police System].
40 See Taiwan Sheng Zhengfu Gongbao No. 59. Autumn 33 (⎘䀋䚩㓧⹄℔⟙) [TAIWAN PROVINCIAL 
GOV’T GAZ.], Aug. 7, 1970, at 2; Zongtongfu Gongbao No. 2287 (䷥䴙⹄℔⟙) [PRESIDENTIAL OFFICE 
GAZ.], July 13, 1971, at 9; Zongtongfu Gongbao No. 2546 (䷥䴙⹄℔⟙) [PRESIDENTIAL OFFICE GAZ.],
Mar. 14, 1973, at 4; Zongtongfu Gongbao No. 2876 (䷥䴙⹄℔⟙) [PRESIDENTIAL OFFICE GAZ.], Apr. 23, 
1975, at 9.
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household registration departments in municipal and township offices. Also,
police conducted many household registration affairs, including, but not 
limited to, issuing National ID Cards, conducting the census of the 
Taiwanese people and their economic activities, and checking household 
statuses.41
For over forty years, the combination of the household registration 
system and the police system allowed the ROC government to closely 
monitor and strictly control Taiwanese citizens. As the period of National 
Mobilization in Suppression of Communist Rebellion ended in 1991, 
combination of the two systems was terminated in 1992 when the Legislative 
Yuan amended the Household Registration Act. 42 However, after the 
systems had been combined for over forty years, the ROC government and 
most Taiwanese people were already accustomed to the law and its practice.
Both the government and the people were not aware that it might be quite 
abnormal and illegitimate to allow police to use personal information
accumulated by the household registration system. Because of the confusion
about the distinction between the two systems, when the government later 
announced its plan to use the household registration system to collect more 
personal information from Taiwanese people, the plan stirred up
considerable legal controversy about personal information among the 
Taiwanese people.
C. The National Identification Card System in Taiwan
As the ROC government constructed its household registration legal 
system in Taiwan, a major component of the system was the issuance of a 
National Identification Card to every Taiwanese citizen, which was made 
mandatory by household registration laws. The Household Registration Act
of 1946, the Regulation for Issuance of National Identification Card to 
Public Officials in Government Departments in Taiwan Province, Taipei 
City, and Central Government in the Province (⎘䀋䚩⎘⊿ⶪ䚩䳂㙐ᷕ⣖
41 See Yang Ching-chiang, A Review of the Combination of Household Registration System and 
Police System and Its Practice, supra note 39, at 56; TSAI WEN-RU (哉㔯⤪), WOGUO GEREN ZILIAO 
ZHENGCE ZHI XINGCHENG YU BIANQIAN 1949–2002: YI HUJI ZILIAO WEI LI (ㆹ⚳ᾳṢ屯㕁㓧䫾ᷳ⼊ㆸ冯
嬲怟 1949–2002—ẍ㇞䯵屯㕁䁢ἳ ) [THE FORMATION AND CHANGE OF TAIWAN’S PERSONAL 
INFORMATION POLICY FROM 1949 TO 2002: THE HOUSEHOLD REGISTRATION SYSTEM AS AN EXAMPLE] 59–
60 (2004); NEIZHENGBU MISHUSHI (ℏ㓧悐䦀㚠⭌) [SECRETARIAT OF MINISTRY OF INTERIOR], LIUSHIBA 
NIANDU NEIZHENG YEWU YANJIU BAOGAO (ℕ⋩ℓ⸜⹎ℏ㓧㤕⊁䞼䨞⟙⏲) [A RESEARCH REPORT ON 
INTERIOR AFFAIRS IN 1979] 497 (1980).
42 See WANG XINHUA (䌳㕘厗), ZHONGGUO HUJI FALU ZHIDU YANJIU (ᷕ⚳㇞䯵㱽⼳⇞⹎䞼䨞) [A
STUDY ON CHINESE HOUSEHOLD REGISTRATION SYSTEM] 273, 277 (2001).
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楸䚩㨇斄℔⊁⒉⚳㮹幓↮嫱枺䘤彎㱽) of 1947, and the Regulation for 
Issuance of National Identification Card to Citizens in Counties and 
Municipalities of the Taiwanese Province (⎘䀋䚩⎬䷋ⶪ⚳㮹幓↮嫱䘤䴎
彎㱽) of 1947 required every Taiwanese citizen above the age of eighteen to 
apply for a National ID Card.43
Generally, the National ID Card policy was effectively enforced. The 
majority of Taiwanese people applied for a National ID Card, and household 
registration offices smoothly issued National ID Cards to the applicants. For 
example, from 1946 to 1947, the household registration offices in Pingtung
County issued National ID Cards to all citizens in the county.44 Moreover, 
in the following two years, the offices re-issued National ID Cards for 
citizens who had lost or damaged their National ID Cards.45
Since the ROC government began to issue National ID Cards in 1947, 
the government has tried to use photographs and fingerprints as ways of 
verifying the identities of Taiwanese people. Under the Household 
Registration Act and the related regulations, the government required
Taiwanese citizens to provide either their photographs or fingerprints when 
applying for National ID Cards. In reality, in 1947, household registration 
offices only asked Taiwanese citizens to provide their fingerprints because 
most Taiwanese people could not afford the fee for taking photographs. The 
household registration offices thus chose to issue National ID Cards with 
only fingerprints, but no photographs.46
However, the fingerprint data on National ID Cards was not a clear 
visual image of the applicant’s fingerprint, but only an indication of the 
43 See CHOU CHUNG-YI (␐ᷕᶨ), HUJI XINGZHENG TONGLUN (㇞䯵埴㓧忂婾) [THE GENERAL 
THEORY OF THE HOUSEHOLD REGISTRATION SYSTEM] 120 (1953); HUJI DENGJI JI HUJI TENGBEN ZHUANAN 
DIAOCHA YANJIU BAOGAO (㇞䯵䘣姀㙐㇞䯵媬㛔⮰㟰婧㞍䞼䨞⟙⏲) [AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE 
HOUSEHOLD REGISTRATION SYSTEM AND HOUSEHOLD REGISTRATION TRANSCRIPT] 41 (Nat’l Dev. Council 
under the Exec. Yuan ed., 1971); THE HISTORY DIVISION, THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR (ℏ㓧悐悐⎚䶐
㑘⮷䳬), NEIZHENGBU BUSHI (ℏ㓧悐悐⎚) [THE HISTORY OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR] 454 (1993).
44 See PINGTUNG CITY GOVERNMENT (⯷㜙ⶪ㓧⹄), PINGDONGSHI HUZHENG SHIFAN GONGZUO 
BAOGAO ( ⯷ 㜙 ⶪ ㇞ 㓧 䣢 䭬 ⶍ ἄ ⟙ ⏲ ) [WORK REPORT OF THE HOUSEHOLD REGISTRATION 
DEMONSTRATION PROJECT IN PINGTUNG CITY] 21 (1949).
45 See id. 
46 See THE HISTORY DIVISION, THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 43, at 454; TAIWAN 
SHENG TONGZHIGAO, VOL. III ZHENGSHI ZHI HUZHENG PIAN (⎘䀋䚩忂⽿ ⌟ᶱ 㓧ḳ⽿㇞㓧䭯) [THE 
HISTORY OF TAIWAN PROVINCE, VOL. III: RECORD OF GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS : CHAPTER OF HOUSEHOLD 
REGISTRATION] 89–90 (Lee Ju-he (㛶㰅␴) et al. eds., 1971).
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fingerprint patterns—loop or whorl.47 The fingerprint data on National ID 
Cards only indicated the very basic classification of fingerprint patterns; it 
was far from an effective and reliable method of verification. In order to 
solve this problem and significantly improve the identification function of 
National ID Cards, when the ROC government re-issued National ID cards
in 1954, it decided to replace the requirement of submitting fingerprint 
information with a photograph, even though Taiwanese people generally still 
regarded the cost for photography as a heavy burden.48
While the fundamental purpose of National ID Cards is identification, 
during the National Mobilization in Suppression of Communist Rebellion,
the ROC government also used these cards for two other purposes:  
preparedness for war and surveillance of people.49 These purposes were 
clearly demonstrated by repeated changes to the information contained on
the National ID Cards. For example, in 1966, the government added a blood 
type column on National ID Cards.50 The assumption was that, if a war 
broke out between the ROC government and the People’s Republic of China, 
hospitals could immediately treat injured people according to the blood type 
47 YU SSU-CHIN (ᾆ㕗拎), XIN HUJIFA SHIYI (㕘㇞䯵㱽慳佑) [THE INTERPRETATION OF THE NEW 
HOUSEHOLD REGISTRATION ACT] 15–16, 21 (1947); WANG XINHUA, supra note 42, at 268; CHOU CHUNG-
YI, supra note 43, at 122.
48 See CIVIL AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT, TAIWAN PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT (⎘䀋䚩㓧⹄㮹㓧⺛), JU
QINGSHI WEI QIANRU RENKOU KEFOU ZHUNYU MIANJIAO XIANGPIAN HUO ZHIWEN HEFU ZHIZHAO YOU 
(㒂婳䣢䁢怟ℍṢ⎋⎗⏎ⅮḰ⃵丛䚠䇯ㆾ㊯䲳㟠⽑䞍䄏䓙) [THE REPLY TO THE REQUEST TO WAIVE THE 
PHOTO OR FINGERPRINT REQUIREMENT] (1949), http://catalog.digitalarchives.tw/?URN=3521804; LI LIAN-
FAN (㛶⹱剛), Taiwan Sheng Zhengli Huji Shishi de Jiantao yu Gaijin (⎘䀋䚩㔜䎮㇞䯵⮎㕥䘬㩊妶冯㓡
忚) [A Critical Review on Implementing Household Registration Affairs], 3.11 ZHONGGUO DIFANG ZIZHI
(ᷕ⚳⛘㕡冒㱣) [CHINA SELF-GOV’T REV.] 13, 13 (1954); TAIWAN SHENG LINSHI SHENG YIHUI (冢䀋䚩
冐㗪䚩嬘㚫) [THE TEMPORAL PROVINCIAL COUNCIL], Taiwan Sheng Zhengfu Han Song Taiwan Sheng 
Guomin Shenfen Zheng Ji Hukou Mingbu Fa Gei Banfa Yizhong Qing Taiwan Sheng Linshi Sheng Yihui 
Shenyi (冢䀋䚩㓧⹄↥復冢䀋䚩⚳㮹幓↮嫱㙐㇞⎋⎵䯧䘤䴎彎㱽ḁ䧖婳冢䀋䚩冐㗪䚩嬘㚫⮑嬘) [The 
Taiwan Provincial Government’s Proposal on the Issuance of National ID Cards and Household Registry to 
Taiwan Provincial Council], Taiwan Sheng Ziyihui Diancang Shuwei Hua Ji Hua: Taiwan Sheng Ziyihui 
Dangan Chaxun Xitong (⎘䀋䚩媖嬘㚫℠啷㔠ỵ⊾妰䔓烉⎘䀋䚩媖嬘㚫㨼㟰㞍娊䲣䴙) [Taiwan 
Provincial Consultative Council Digitalizing Plan: The Taiwan Provincial Consultative Council Searching 
System] (1958).
49 TAIWAN GUANGFU SAWUNIAN (⎘䀋⃱⽑⋭Ḽ⸜) [THIRTY-FIVE YEARS SINCE THE RESTORATION 
FROM THE JAPANESE RULE] 54 (Info. Serv.  Dep’t in the Taiwan Provincial Gov’t (冢䀋䚩㓧⹄㕘倆嗽䶐)
ed., 1980).
50 See Household Registration Office, Daan District, Taipei City (⎘⊿ⶪ⣏⬱⋨㇞㓧ḳ⊁㇨), 
Guomin Shenfenzheng Yange: Guomin Shenfenzheng Yangben Zhanchu Wenjian (⚳㮹幓↮嫱㱧朑烉⚳㮹
幓↮嫱㧋㛔⯽↢㔯ẞ) [History of the National Identity Cards: Exhibition of Samples of the National 
Identity Cards], Daanqu Huzheng Shiwusuo Dangan Guanli Zhishiwang (⎘⊿ⶪ⣏⬱⋨㇞㓧ḳ⊁㇨㨼㟰
䭉䎮䞍嬀䵚 ) [TAIPEI CITY DAAN DISTRICT HOUSEHOLD REGISTRATION OFFICE DATA MANAGEMENT 
KNOWLEDGE NETWORK], http://www.gov.taipei/ct.asp?xitem=971761&CtNode=21683&mp=100044 (last 
visited Feb. 20, 2016).
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record on their National ID Cards. 51 In addition, as the government 
increased the personal information on the National ID Card, the police could 
examine the increasingly detailed National ID Card to check the identity and 
intention of a suspicious individual who might be a missing person or an 
escaped convict.52
To further its surveillance and control over every Taiwanese person,
the ROC government assigned a National ID Card number to each 
Taiwanese person when the person reached the age of fourteen and applied 
for a National ID Card.53 In 1954, the government began to assign a number 
to each National ID Card, which simply represented an ordinal number for 
the card itself, not for the card holder. Yet, in 1966, the government 
modified and improved the mechanism of generating National ID Card 
numbers, attaching a permanent number to each Taiwanese person when the 
person applied for the card at the age of fourteen. The government explicitly 
claimed that the function of the National ID Card number was to mobilize 
and tax Taiwanese people. In 1971, the government began to assign 
National ID Card numbers to each Taiwanese person at birth.54 In that sense, 
the National ID Card number was no longer a number for the card; instead, 
it became a number of the person.
As many laws and regulations require Taiwanese people to present 
their National ID Cards in various official procedures, National ID Cards 
have gradually become an indispensable document for Taiwanese people to 
prove their identity.  For example, according to the Notary Act, when 
making notarial deeds, notaries shall require applicants to provide their 
National ID Cards to prove their identities.55 The Public Officials Election 
and Recall Act and the Presidential and Vice Presidential Election and 
Recall Act require that, on an election day, voters present their National ID 
51 See Liang Kuang-en (㠩⺋】), Taimin Diqu Tongyi Genghuan Xin Guomin Shenfenzheng Choubei 
Jingguo (⎘救⛘⋨䴙ᶨ㚜㎃㕘⚳㮹幓↮嫱䯴⁁䴻忶) [The Preparatory Proceedings for Upgrading the 
National ID Card System in Taiwan and Fujian Province], 4(3) JINGXUE CONGKAN (嬎⬠⎊↲) [POLICE 
SCI. Q.] 67, 67, 72 (1975).
52 Yang Ching-chiang (㣲㶭㰇), Hujing Heyi Zhidu Youguan Wenti de Tantao (㇞嬎⎰ᶨ⇞⹎㚱斄
⓷柴䘬㍊妶) [Discussion on Issues Pertaining to the Combination of the Household Registration System 
and the Police System], 9(3) JINGXUE CONGKAN (嬎⬠⎊↲) [POLICE SCI. Q.] 20, 26 (1979).
53 The minimum age requirement to apply for National ID Cards was lowered from eighteen to 
fourteen when the ROC government re-issued National ID Cards in 1954.
54 See NEIZHENGBU HUZHENGSI (ℏ㓧悐㇞㓧⎠) [THE DEPARTMENT OF HOUSEHOLD REGISTRATION 
IN THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR], QUANMIAN HUANFA GUOMIN SHENFENZHENG DASHIJI (ℐ朊㎃䘤⚳㮹幓
↮嫱⣏ḳ䲨) [THE CHRONICLES OF NATIONAL ID CARD REFORM] 12 (2007).
55 The Notary Act, art. 19 (1974).
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Cards to receive a ballot.56 The Enforcement Rules of the Passport Act also 
requires applicants for an ROC passport to submit their original National ID 
Cards and a copy thereof to receive a passport. 57 According to the 
Enforcement Rules of the Labor Pension Act, when applying for the payment 
of retirement pensions, laborers must present a copy of their National ID 
Cards. 58 In most state-administered examinations, examinees have to 
present their National ID Cards to be permitted into the test sites. When 
applying for a professional license for business passenger vehicles,
applicants must have their National ID Cards ready for inspection.
Moreover, Taiwanese people are often asked to present their National ID 
Cards as proof of their identities in daily private activities, such as opening a 
bank account and participating in job interviews. Therefore, National ID 
Cards have become important personal identity documents for Taiwanese 
people in their public and private lives.59
D. Collecting Fingerprints for Crime Prevention and Inspection
Since the beginning of the ROC’s rule of Taiwan in 1945, the 
government has collected the fingerprints of a large number of Taiwanese 
people. Initially, as part of Taiwanese criminal procedure, the government
collected fingerprints of prisoners through the detention process and prison 
system. Under the Detention Act (估㉤㱽 ), detention facilities require 
detainees to provide their fingerprints.60 Also, according to the Prison Act
(䚋䋬埴↹㱽) of 1945, prisons record the fingerprints of all inmates at the 
time of their entry into a facility.61 Detention facilities and prisons have 
used the collected fingerprints to verify the identity of detained persons or 
prisoners following their release. In this sense, the fingerprints were only 
used to guarantee that the same person entered and then left the detention 
56 Public Officials Election and Recall Act, art. 21 (1980); Presidential and Vice Presidential 
Election and Recall Act, art. 14 (1995).
57 Enforcement Rules of the Passport Act, art. 8 (2002).
58 Enforcement Rules of the Labor Pension Act, art. 37 (2005).
59 See SIFAYUAN DAFAGUAN HUIYI JIESHI DI 603 HAO (⎠㱽昊⣏㱽⭀㚫嬘妋慳䫔 603 嘇) [The 
Judicial Yuan No. 603 Interpretation] 2005, SIFAYUAN DAFAGUAN HUIYI (⎠㱽昊⣏㱽⭀㚫嬘) [Council of 
Grand Justices:  constitutional court] (2005) (Taiwan) [hereinafter SHIZI No. 603]. 
60 According to Detention Act of 1945, detention facilities require detainees to provide their 
fingerprints to check the identity of the detainees when they leave the detention facilities.  This requirement 
implies that the detention facilities did collect the fingerprints of the detainees when they entered the 
detention facility, though the statute did not explicitly express the requirement.  This legislative omission 
was later rectified in 1954 by an amendment to the Detention Act.  According to the amended Detention 
Act, detention facilities shall collect and check the fingerprints of detainees when they enter and leave the 
detention facilities. See Detention Act, art. 35 (1945); Detention Act, arts. 9, 35 (1954).
61 Prison Act art. 13 (1945).
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facility or prison. Yet, later, the ROC government expanded the scope of 
collecting fingerprints. In 1952, the Ministry of Justice issued the 
enforcement outlines governing fingerprints of sentenced persons, which
required all guilty defendants to provide their fingerprints to prosecutors’
offices, regardless of whether the defendant was punished by incarceration 
in a jail or prison, or paid a fine to the government.62
In addition, since 1947, the police system has been collecting
fingerprints of suspects to confirm their identities. According to the
Regulation of the Taiwan Provincial Police Administration and Its 
Subordinate Police Departments Filing Criminal Records (⎘䀋䚩嬎⊁嗽㙐
㇨Ⱄ嬎⮇╖ỵ彎䎮䉗伒䲨抬彎㱽) and the Regulation for All Levels Police 
Departments Filing Criminal Records (⎬䳂嬎⮇㨇斄↹㟰䲨抬彎㱽 ),
police officers should take photographs and record fingerprints of suspects
who probably had committed crimes and would be transferred to prosecutors’
offices for further investigation.63 While the regulations only allowed the 
police to record fingerprints of suspects deemed likely to have committed 
crimes, the police did not strictly comply with this requirement. In practice, 
the police would broadly record the fingerprints of all suspects who were
arrested to collect as much personal information as possible.64 Through this 
process, the police system has gradually accumulated more and more 
fingerprints of Taiwanese people.
As the police system collected huge amounts of fingerprint data from
Taiwanese people, the ROC government used the fingerprint data not only to 
confirm the identity of arrested suspects, but also to investigate the identity 
of unknown criminals. In order to collect more fingerprints for criminal 
62 See Hsu Heng-hsi (⼸俾䅁), Banli Shouxingren Zhiwen Zhi Mude Yu Shixiao (彎䎮⍿↹Ṣ㊯䲳ᷳ
䚖䘬冯⮎㓰) [The Purpose and Effect of Collecting Fingerprints from Prisoners], 16(4) XINGSHIFA ZAZHI
(↹ḳ㱽暄娴) [CRIM. L.J.] 12, 12–15 (1972).
63 Regulation of the Taiwanese Provincial Police Administration’s Criminal Records Filing, art. 15 
(1956); Regulation for All Levels Police Departments Criminal Records Filing, art. 14 (1979).
64 Hsu Sheng-hsi (⼸俾䅁 ), Zhiwen Kapian Zhi Sheji (㊯䲳⌉䇯ᷳ姕妰 ) [The Design of 
Fingerprints Card], 2 XINGSHI KEXUE (↹ḳ䥹⬠) [CRIM. SCIENCE] 45, 45 (1975); 24 TAIWAN SHENG 
YIHUI GONGBAO NO. 26 (⎘䀋䚩嬘㚫℔⟙) [TAIWAN PROVINCIAL COUNCIL GAZ. No. 24] 1254 (May 18, 
1971); Taiwan Sheng Xingzheng Zhangguan Gongshu Jingwuchu (⎘䀋䚩埴㓧攟⭀℔会嬎⊁嗽) [The
Police Force, Taiwan Provincial Administration Office], Jingwuchu Qianni Xiuzheng Taiwan Sheng 
Jingwuchu ji Suoshu Geji Jingcha Danwei Banli Fanzui Jilu Banfa Qingti Fu Huishen Yi-an (嬎⊁嗽䯥㒔
ᾖ㬋冢䀋䚩嬎⊁嗽㙐㇨Ⱄ⎬䳂嬎⮇╖ỵ彎䎮䉗伒䲨抬彎㱽婳㍸⹄㚫⮑嬘㟰) [The Proposal to Revise 
the Measures of Processing Criminal Records in the Police Force from the Police Force Department to the 
Taiwan Provincial Council] (June 19, 1967), http://catalog.digitalarchives.tw/item/00/36/54/fb.html; 26
TAIWAN SHENG YI HUI GONG BAO NO. 29 (⎘䀋䚩嬘㚫℔⟙) [TAIWAN PROVINCIAL COUNCIL GAZ.] 253
(1972).
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inspection, the Ministry of the Interior—not the Ministry of National 
Defense—has collected fingerprints of draftees through the military system.
In September 1952, the police agencies of the Taiwan Provincial 
Government and its county governments started to collect fingerprints from
all Taiwanese males who, as draftees, were required to take physical 
examinations at the age of eighteen.65 By 1983, under the instruction of the
National Police Agency in the Ministry of Interior, the Criminal 
Investigation Bureau accumulated the fingerprint data of around six million 
Taiwanese people, four-fifths of whom were draftees.66 The officials of the 
Taiwan Provincial Government never denied that the true purpose of 
collecting fingerprints was for crime prevention and inspection, and the 
police agencies currently use the fingerprint database to identify suspects in 
actual cases.67 However, the practice has never been clearly authorized by 
any police law or military law.
IV. POST-NATIONAL MOBILIZATION FOR SUPPRESSION OF THE COMMUNIST 
REBELLION PERIOD
To respond to the Taiwanese people’s demand, 68 the period of 
National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion was 
ultimately ended in 1991. Since then, the whole Taiwanese legal system was 
in transition.69 The Household Registration Act also started its new life 
65 See Taiwan Sheng Xingzheng Zhangguan Gongshu Jingwu Chu (冢䀋䚩埴㓧攟⭀℔会嬎⊁嗽)
[The Police Force, Taiwan Provincial Administration Office], Jingwuchu Qianni Juban Sishiyi Niandu 
Yinan Zhiwen Dengji Qingcha He-an (嬎⊁嗽䯥㒔冱彎⚃⋩ᶨ⸜⹎⼡䓟㊯䲳䘣姀婳⮇㟠㟰) [The Police 
Force Department’s Proposal to Collect Fingerprints from Draftees in 1952],
http://catalog.digitalarchives.tw/item/00/36/30/0d.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2016).
66 See Zhiwen Diannaohua Zhiri Kedai Jianli Guomin Zhiwen Dang-an, Yi Diannao Bidui Tigao 
Zhenban Xing-An Jixiao Jue Songqing Lifa (㊯䲳暣儎⊾㊯㖍⎗⼭ ⺢䩳⚳㮹㊯䲳㨼㟰ˣẍ暣儎㭼⮵ ㍸
檀”彎↹㟰䷦㓰ˣ㰢復婳䩳㱽) [The Prospect of Digitizing Fingerprints: To Establish the National 
Database About Fingerprints for Facilitating Inspection], ZHONGGUO SHIBAO (ᷕ⚳㗪⟙) [CHINA TIMES],
Oct. 27, 1983, at 6.
67 See Tang Jing-lan & Li Wen-bang (Ⓒ䴻㿦&㛶㔯恎), Bidui Zhiwen Dafei Shoujiao Tuyin Qiang-
An Xianru Jiaozhuo (㭼⮵㊯䲳⣏屣ㇳ儛⛇戨㏞㟰星㕤先叿), [Robbery in the Land Bank Stalled Because 
of the Difficulties of Matching Fingerprints], [LIANHE XINWEN WANG] (倗⎰㕘倆䵚) [UNITED DAILY 
NEWS], Apr. 26, 1982, at 3.
68 In March 1990, a student movement, the Wild Lily Movement, sought general elections for all 
representatives at the central governmental level, successfully awakening the Taiwanese people to the need 
for wider political participation.  Facing the potential pressures of being overthrown, the Kuomintang elites 
took the lead or took joint actions with the opposition party through negotiations to bring about democracy.  
See Teresa Wright, Student Mobilization in Taiwan: Civil Society and Its Discontents, 39 ASIAN SURVEY,
986–1008 (1999).  
69 The 8th Amendment of the ROC Constitution of 1991 states: “If the revision of laws originally in 
effect solely during the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion is not 
completed by the termination of the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist 
Rebellion, these laws shall remain in effect until July 31, 1992.” MINGUO XIANFA art. 8 (1991) (Taiwan).
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journey. However, the advance of computer and communication technology, 
and the public’s panic over the social disorder made the protection on rights 
to privacy more vulnerable. 
A. Separation of Household Administration and Police Administration  
As the process of separating the household administration and police 
administration systems began in 1992, in theory the police were no longer 
allowed to access and share the personal information in the household 
registration database without authorization. However, in reality, the police 
did not change their existing practices overnight.  Throughout the 1990s, the 
police continued to access the personal information in the household 
registration system without substantial restriction. Moreover, the 
development of computer and communication technology compounded the 
threat to privacy rights presented by the household registration system.70
B. Advances and Impacts of Computer and Communication Technology
Advances in computer and communication technology dramatically 
facilitated administrative efficiency, as well as government management for 
general welfare,71 but it also strengthened the government’s power to extend 
its arm to grasp the personal information than ever. In the 1990s, pursuing 
economic growth became the driving goal in Taiwan.  The Taiwanese 
people zealously accepted any policy stimulating economic growth. In order 
to meet social as well as economic needs, the government proposed
administrative reforms and e-government policies. These reforms and 
70 Taiwan’s privacy rights have evolved in two contexts: torts and constitutional law.  In the context 
of torts, unlike the four privacy torts described by William Prosser, the National Development Council 
under the Executive Yuan in Taiwan concluded the scope of the right to privacy merely covered intrusion 
and public disclosure.  See WONG YUE-SHENG (佩ⱛ䓇) et al., ZIXUN LIFA ZHI YANJIU (屯妲䩳㱽ᷳ䞼䨞)
[A STUDY ON LEGISLATING INFORMATION] 35–37 (Research Development and Evaluation Commission ed.,
July 1985); William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960).  In the context of the Constitution, the 
right to privacy is found in the penumbras of the Constitution.  The zone of privacy was inferred from other 
enumerated rights, like Article 8 (the guarantee of personal freedom), and Article 12 (the freedom of 
privacy of correspondence).
71 Paul M. Schwartz, Data Processing and Government Administration:  The Failure of the 
American Legal Response to the Computer, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1321, 1332 (1992) (“But when the 
individual's pursuit of happiness depends on governmental maintenance of the social, political, and physical 
environment, the government must gather more and more information from within the boundaries of the 
supposedly private sphere.  Compared to its historic role, the state today depends upon the availability of 
vast quantities of information, and much of the data it now collects relates to identifiable individuals.  
Indeed, the fulfillment of many governmental objectives depends on the gathering of such personal 
information.”).
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policies were justified as improving the economic well-being of Taiwanese 
citizens.72
In the context of household registration, as early as 1985 the 
government planned to completely digitalize the household registration 
information and established a central, nation-wide digital database to 
enhance administrative efficiency and accuracy.73 The implementation of a
digital database in October 1997 achieved these goals by lowering the 
burden of transcribing information, decreasing the processing time for 
applications, minimizing clerical or mathematical mistakes, and offering 
more opportunities for people to confirm or correct their personal 
information.74
However, the digitalization also created more opportunities for the 
abuse of privacy rights by opening an unexpected backdoor to unscrupulous 
parties, such as hackers and avaricious officials colluding with fraud rings or
the mafia. 75 Due to advanced computer technology, the government no 
longer needed to expend considerable human resources to verify and 
authenticate information. Instead, an official was capable of operating a 
computer to completely identify a particular individual. Moreover, the 
improved communication technology decreased the time required to transmit
official documents containing personal information. As a result, these 
technologies have not only substantially improved the government’s
capacity to aggregate and process the existing personal data to verify identity,
but also offered significant opportunities to a few greedy officials to abuse 
their office to sell personal information or satisfy their curiosity. As these 
technologies become increasingly relied upon, it is not feasible to ban the 
72 For more information on the concept and five-step plan of e-government in Taiwan, see Dianzi
Hua Zhengfu Jihua (暣⫸⊾㓧⹄妰䔓) [The E-Government Plan], (埴㓧昊䞼侫㚫) [NAT’L DEV’T
COUNCIL UNDER THE EXECUTIVE YUAN] http://www.ndc.gov.tw/Content_List.aspx?
n=E0C48B7F39ACB61F (last visited Jan. 20, 2016) (official website of the National Development Council 
under the Executive Yuan).
73 See Huyizheng Zixun Xitong Tuiguang Jihua (㇞⼡㓧屯妲䲣䴙㍐⺋妰∫) [The Expansion of the 
Digitalization of the Household and Military Registration System] (promulgated by the National 
Development Council, Aug. 8, 1996), www.ndc.gov.tw/dn.aspx?uid=15064.
74 The administrative process for people to confirm and correct their personal information in the 
household registration system before and after Sept. 30 1997. See Tainei Huzi (⎘ℏ㇞⫿) [The Household 
Registration Office’s Interpretation Letter], No. 1031201790 (䫔 1031201790 嘇 ) [Apr. 2, 2015],
http://chience-hr.kcg.gov.tw/politicsD01_f_12_104_2.html.
75 Kuo Kuang Chao (悕⋉崭), Lanyong ban-an liqi xie ge zi gei zha dai yezhe buxiao diaocha yuan
qiantao (㾓䓐彎㟰⇑☐㳑ᾳ屯䴎姸屠㤕侭 ᶵ倾婧㞍⒉㼃徫) [Unscrupulous Investigators Abscond for 
Leaking Personal Information to Rings], ZHONGGUO SHIBAO (ᷕ⚳㗪⟙) [CHINA TIMES] (Jan. 13, 2016), 
http://www.chinatimes.com/realtimenews/20160113002240-260401 .
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usage of computer technology in data collection or terminate the e-
government policy. In light of this reality, the protection of privacy rights 
depends on procedural controls, such as specifying the purposes and 
conditions for collecting personal information to prevent unwanted 
invasions.76
In order to protect privacy rights that were in danger of being
challenged by advanced technology, in 1995 the Legislative Yuan enacted 
the Computer-Processed Personal Data Protection Law (暣儎嗽䎮ᾳṢ屯
㕁ᾅ嬟㱽 ) to regulate the collection and use of personal information.
However, due to the unclear language of the statute,77 it failed to completely 
close the loopholes in the protection of individual privacy. Even 
Department of Justice officials conceded that the Computer-Processed 
Personal Data Protection Law did not clearly require the government to 
specify its purpose and conditions for collecting, processing, and using 
personal information. 78 As a result, such law failed to provide clear 
guidance on exceptions, and exacerbated threats to privacy by granting huge 
discretion to government officials. 79 The legislature’s decision has paved 
the way for government officials to access and share personal information in 
the household registration database without substantial restriction or 
imposing corresponding burdens. The law also suggests that the legislation 
was prepared to sacrifice individual privacy rights in order to gain political 
capital and reduce administrative inefficiency. Most Taiwanese citizens 
continued to focus on the positive economic development generated by the 
76 See Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Participation: Personal Information and Public Sector 
Regulation in the United States, 80 IOWA L. REV. 553, 555 (1995).
77 See Diannao Chuli Geren Ziliao Baohu Fa (暣儎嗽䎮ᾳṢ屯㕁ᾅ嬟㱽) [Computer-Processed 
Personal Data Protection Law] (1995) (Taiwan) (the first law regulating the personal information); 83
LIFAYUAN GONGBAO NO. 45 (VOL. 2719–2), (䩳㱽昊℔⟙ 83⌟ 45㛇 2719嘇ᶳ) [LEGIS. YUAN OFFICIAL 
GAZ.], at 523 (1994) (in 2010, the legislature revised a large amount of provisions to try to close the 
loopholes and changed the law name to “Personal Information Protection Act”).
78 Liu Tso-kuo (∱Ỹ⚳), Woguo Geren Ziliao Yinsi Quanyi Zhi Baohu炼“Diannao Chuli Geren 
Ziliao Baohufa” Zhi Lifa yu Xiufa Guocheng (ㆹ⚳ᾳṢ屯㕁晙䥩㪲䙲ᷳᾅ嬟炼暣儎嗽䎮ᾳṢ屯㕁ᾅ嬟
㱽ᷳ䩳㱽冯ᾖ㱽忶䦳) [The Protection on Taiwanese Personal Information—The Legislative History of 
Computer-Processing Personal Data Protection Law], 307 LUSHI ZAZHI (⼳ⷓ暄娴) [TAIPEI BAR J.] 42, 42
(2005); 86 LIFAYUAN GONGBAO NO. 21, VOL. 2913-1 (䩳㱽昊℔⟙86⌟21㛇2913嘇ᶲ) [LEGIS. YUAN 
OFFICIAL GAZ.], at 115 (1997).
79 Liu Tso-kuo, supra note 78, at 44–46. For example, Article 8 provides, “the information may be 
used outside the scope upon the occurrence of one of the following conditions:  1. Where in accordance 
with law; 3.  Where it is for national security; 4.  Where it is to promote public interests; 5.  Where it is to 
prevent harm on the life, body, freedom or property of the Party; 6.  Where it is to prevent harm on the 
rights and interests of other people; 7. Necessary for academic research without harm to the major interests 
of others. 8.  Where such use may benefit the Party.”  Diannao Chuli Geren Ziliao Baohu Fa (㟁⭔⹦⌮ಶ
ே㈨ᩱಖㆤἲ) [Computer-Processed Personal Data Protection Law] art. 8 (1995).
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government’s policy and were unaware of the potential risks attendant in 
expanding government power and access to their personal information.80
Thus, the combination of advances in computer technology, Taiwan’s 
administrative framework, and the lack of adequate procedural controls on 
government agencies substantially diminished privacy rights in Taiwan.81
C. Social Disorder in the 1990s and the Amendment of the Household 
Registration Act
In addition to public perceptions of positive economic growth and 
administrative efficiency, public concerns over reduced social order further 
undermined privacy rights and delayed the development of privacy 
protections in Taiwanese society.
1. Three Grave Criminal Incidents in 1996 and an Outcry over Social 
Disorder
As the National Mobilization in Suppression of Communist Rebellion 
period ended, the government’s ability to supervise and control social order 
gradually faded. As a result, the mafia and the big corporations rapidly 
filled the power vacuum, leading to social unrest.82 In light of this collective 
fear of personal safety, a flagrant criminal incident could easily trigger 
public outrage. In 1996, a number of unsolved violent crimes, including 
murders83 and kidnappings,84 occurred in Taiwan and further and aroused 
80 See Chou Kuie-tien (␐㟪䓘) & Chang Chun-mei (⻝㶛伶), Chizhixing Gaokeji Fengxian Shehui 
xia zhi Dianfan Douzheng—Yi Huanfa Shenfenzheng Anna Zhiwenan Wei Fenxi (怚㺗✳檀䥹㈨桐晒䣦㚫
ᶳᷳ℠䭬櫍䇕--ẍ㎃䘤幓↮嫱㊱㌢㊯䲳㟰䁢↮㜸) [Paradigm Conflict Within Hidden and Delayed High-
Tech Risk Society: With Special Focus on the Case of “New ID Card Application with Fingerprint 
Submission”], 17 SOCIETAS: A J. FOR PHIL. STUDY OF PUB. AFF. (㓧㱣冯䣦㚫⒚⬠姽婾) 127, 127–215 
(2006).
81 For example, the Internal Revenue office is able to carry out tax collection and tax law 
enforcement via accessing the personal information data in the household registration system.  See Chiu
Ying-Ming (恙劙㖶), Daiban jieshui zhuan siren qian xingbutong le (ẋ彎䭨䦭岢㬣Ṣ拊埴ᶵ忂Ḯ) [Tax 
Agents Will No Longer Use the Dead for Tax Evasion], LIANHE XINWEN WANG (倗⎰㕘倆䵚) [UNITED 
DAILY NEWS] (Sept. 11 2006), http://city.udn.com/54543/1848486. 
82 The former minister of Justice, Liao Cheng-hao, conceded, in 1994, 5%-10% of representatives at 
the central government level had mafia backgrounds, and around one thirds of local council members had 
mafia related records.  See Liao Cheng-hao (⹾㬋尒), Wushi Nianlai Liang-an Xíngfa Xhi Fazhan (Ḽ⋩⸜
ἮℑⱠ↹㱽ᷳ䘤⯽) [The evolution of criminal law in the cross-strait], 51 FALING YUEKAN (㱽Ẍ㚰↲)
[LAW MONTHLY] 2, 596–604 (2000); Wu Chin-en (⏛奒】), The Evolution of Money Politics in the Local 
Assembly: An Analysis of Verdicts, 12(2) TAIWAN POL. SCI. REV. 165 (2008).
83 Irene Lin, Man Claims to Have Killed Peng Wan-ru, TAIPEI TIMES (Sept. 16, 1999), 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/1999/09/16/0000002755.
84 Richard Lloyd-Parry, Celebrity Killings Stir Rage in Taiwan, INDEPENDENT (July 12, 1997), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/celebrity-killings-stir-rage-in-taiwan-1250497.html.   
APRIL 2016 IDENTITY LAWS AND PRIVACY PROTECTION IN TAIWAN 247
public concern. Tens of thousands people marched and protested perceived
failures of the criminal justice policy, demanding that Premier Lien Chan
resign.85 In addition, many Taiwanese people were dissatisfied with police 
inefficiency in solving the cases, leading to nostalgia for the police state in 
the period of National Mobilization in Suppression of Communist 
Rebellion. 86 They requested the government to re-extend its power to 
identify suspects by collecting personal information for fingerprint
comparison, and to enforce the law rigorously.87
2. The Amendment of the Household Registration Act in 1997
In response to the strong public desire for a restoration of social order, 
in 1996 the Ministry of the Interior proposed a bill to amend the Household 
Registration Act to again collect the citizens’ fingerprints and set up a 
central national database.88 According to Article Eight of the proposed bill,
when re-issuing the new version of National ID Cards, the government 
would require citizens at fourteen or older to submit their fingerprints during 
the application procedure.89 Under the atmosphere of anxiety over social 
order,90 the bill was promulgated and implemented on May 21, 1997 without 
85 Marchers Demand That Premier Resign, THE SPOKESMAN-REVIEW (May 19, 1997), 
http://www.spokesman.com/stories/1997/may/19/marchers-demand-that-premier-resign/.   
86 See supra Part III; Wu Naiteh (⏛ᷫ⽟), Reformer or Dictator? Reassessing the Role of Chiang 
Ching-guo in the Democratic Transition (⚆ㅞ哋䴻⚳炻㆟⾝哋䴻⚳ ), in GUOSHI GUAN (⚳⎚棐 )
[ACADEMIA HISTORICA], ERSHI SHIJI TAIWAN MINZHU FAZHAN (Ḵ⋩ᶾ䲨⎘䀋㮹ᷣ䘤⯽) [TAIWANESE 
DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE 20TH CENTURY] 467, 502 (2004).
87 See Chien Yeong-Shyang (拊㯠䤍䫱) et al., Laodage–Zhuliu Minyi–Nide Zhiwen: Ziyou Zhuyi yu 
Wanjin Renquan Zhengyi (侩⣏⒍—ᷣ㳩㮹シ—Ἀ䘬㊯䲳烉冒䓙ᷣ佑冯㘂役Ṣ㪲䇕嬘) [The Big Brother 
Mainstream Thinking—Your Fingerprints, Liberalism and Recent Controversies over Human Rights], 59
TAIWAN: A RADICAL Q. SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES, 223, 229–231 (2005).  
88 See 85 LIFAYUAN GONGBAO NO. 65 (VOL. 2887-3) (䩳㱽昊℔⟙ 85 ⌟ 65 㛇) [LEGIS. YUAN 
OFFICIAL GAZ.], at 350-368, 374–78 (Nov. 28, 1996) (Interior Minister Fong-cheng Lin stated the necessity 
to collect fingerprints for social order in his opening statement in the Legislative Yuan.  Then the minister 
changed his tone, focusing on verification, and mentioned maintaining social order was just “contingent 
benefits,” instead of main objectives).
89 Article 8, Section 2 of the Huji Fa (㇞䯵㱽) [Household Registration Act] provides, “While 
applying for an ROC identity card pursuant to the preceding paragraph, the applicant shall be fingerprinted 
for record keeping; provided that no national who is under fourteen years of age will be fingerprinted until 
he or she reaches fourteen years of age, at which time he or she shall then be fingerprinted for record 
keeping.”  Art. 8 sec. 3 provides, “No ROC identity card will be issued unless the applicant is fingerprinted 
pursuant to the preceding paragraph.”
90 See 86 LIFAYUAN GONGBAO NO. 21 (VOL. 2913–1) (䩳㱽昊℔⟙ 86 ⌟ 21 㛇 2913 Ⅎ ᶲℲ)
[LEGIS. YUAN OFFICIAL GAZ.], at 115 (Apr. 29, 1997) (during the legislative deliberation, some legislators 
argued that the national fingerprint database was capable of integrating the police records for maintaining 
social order and facilitating police identification of suspects).
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substantial objections from the Legislature.91 Yet, due to budget limits and 
technology difficulties, the government did not enforce the new policy of re-
issuing National ID Cards until 2005.
3. Human Rights Organizations and Bar Associations Dissented
From 1997 to 2004, the dissenting voices against the amendment of 
the Household Registration Act did not draw much public attention, but the 
concern about privacy rights attracted human rights activists’ attentions and 
aroused public debates in response to other policies.92 Before issuing the 
new fingerprint version of National ID Cards, in late 1997, the government 
proposed issuing “smart IC cards,” 93 which integrated the conventional 
National ID Cards, driver licenses, health insurance cards, and financial 
transaction records, in a single IC card.94 This proposal immediately raised 
considerable public concern about data secrecy. 95 The government 
withdrew the proposal in November 1998 due to a series of protests from 
human rights organizations and a failure to reach an agreement with the 
potential coordinating partner.96
This social movement against the smart IC cards plan was a turning 
point for Taiwanese society in advocating for citizens’ privacy. It was the 
91 In the same year, the Xing Qinhai Fanzui Fangzhi Fa (⿏Ὕ⭛䉗伒旚㱣㱽) [Sexual Assault Crime 
Prevention Act] (2012) was implemented, which granted the police the power to collect DNA sample from 
sexual offenders without warrant. Art. 7 § 1 of Sexual Assault Crime Prevention Act: “the central 
authorities should set up a national archive of sexual offenders, and it should contain name, gender, date of 
birth, national identification number, domicile or place of residence, photograph, criminal information, 
fingerprints, DNA, and other information.”
92 For the disputes on the Bill on “The Guideline on National Civil Servants to Declare Their 
Loyalties” (℔⊁⒉⮵⚳⭞⾈婈䓛⟙ἄ㤕天溆), see Zhongcheng Dang-an Bixu Lifa Guifan Shi Neng 
Zhixing (⾈婈㨼㟰⽭枰䩳㱽夷䭬⥳傥➟埴) [A Due Process Requirement on the Loyalty Archives]
ZHONGGUO SHIBAO (ᷕ⚳㗪⟙) [CHINA TIMES], Aug. 6 1998, at A3.
93 Guomin Shenfen Jianbao Heyi Zhihui Ka (⚳㮹幓↮‍ᾅ⎰ᶨ㘢ㄏ⌉) [Smart IC Card].
94 See He Cyuan-de (ỽℐ⽟), Qiantan Guominka Zhi Anquan Linian (㶢婯⚳㮹⌉ᷳ⬱ℐ䎮⾝)
[The Concept of Security in the Smart IC Cards], ZIXUN ANQUAN TONGXUN (屯妲⬱ℐ忂妲) [5(1) 
COMMUNICATIONS OF THE CCISA] 15–24 (Dec. 1998).  
95 Id. But unfortunately, the public concern was not about the expanding power of the government, 
but mainly about the risk of data leakage.  
96 The winning bidder, The Smart Card Alliance, led by Rebar Group, refused to sign the final 
agreement with the government because of the concern of enhanced and unpredicted costs of issuing the 
smart card on Nov. 26, 1998.  See Wu Jingyi(ⶓ朄⭄) Lvli Qin(⏪渿䏜), & Li Hongzhang(㛶泣䐳), 
Guomin Ka Celue Guihua yu Qi Yunzuo Anquan yu Fayuan Guihua (⚳㮹⌉䫾䔍夷∫冯℞忳ἄ⬱ℐ冯㱽
㸸夷∫) [Planning the Strategies of the Smart IC Cards and Their Security and Legal Basis], ᷕ厗㮹⚳屯
妲 ⬠ 㚫 [INSTITUTE OF INFORMATION & COMPUTING MACHINERY], http://www.iicm.org.tw/
communication/c2_1/page03.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2016) (official website of the Institute of 
Information and Computing Machinery).
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first time that the public in Taiwan was aware of the risk of data leakage and 
raised concerns about data secrecy. Henceforth, the need to protect privacy 
rights has taken root in the minds of many intellectuals and created a critical 
mass of Taiwanese lay people who monitor the government’s attempts to 
expand its power without adequate restrictions.
Due to additional public attention to privacy rights after the failure of 
the IC Card legislation, in 2004 Taiwanese citizens began to express greater 
concern over the National ID Card’s fingerprint requirement. 97 The 
government stated that the new National ID Card policy, requiring citizens 
to be fingerprinted and establishing a central national database, would be put 
into practice in July 2005.98 Following the example of the social movement 
against the smart IC cards in 1998, human rights organizations and bar 
associations immediately formed The Rejection of Being Fingerprinted 
Coalition,99 and strongly opposed the policy.100 They were concerned about 
revival of the police state and creation of a grave risk of information 
leaks.101 Additionally, Vice President Hsiu-lien Lu and her leading Human 
Rights Council under the president’s office102 criticized the collection of 
fingerprints as being outside the authorized scope of “household 
administrative management.”103 The dissenters raised concerns about the 
legitimacy and constitutionality of two core provisions of Article Eight of 
97 TAIWAN ASSOCIATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (⎘䀋Ṣ㪲Ὣ忚㚫), 2005 NIAN TAIWAN RENQUAN 
BAOGAO (2005⸜⎘䀋Ṣ㪲⟙⏲) [TAIWAN HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 2005].
98 See Xingzheng Yuan di 2941 Ci Yuan Hui Jueyi (埴㓧昊䫔 2941 㫉昊㚫㰢嬘) [Premier’s 
Resolutions from Executive Yuan Meetings No. 2941] EXECUTIVE YUAN (June 1, 2005), 
http://www.ey.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=4F2A6F26A44C68AC&sms=FF87AB3AC4507DE3&s=98B
10311D8099FAD (official website of the Executive Yuan).
99 Ju-an Zhiwen 524 Xingdong Lianmeng (㉺㊱㊯䲳 524 埴≽倗䚇 ) [Anti-Fingerprint Card 
Coalition], Fan Guominka Xingdong Lianmeng (⍵⚳㮹⌉埴≽倗䚇) [Anti-Smart IC Card Coalition] 
http://taiwan.yam.org.tw/nonid/analysis.html (last modified Sept. 15, 1998).
100 See Syong Aicing (䄲ッ⌧), IC Ka Yingyong de Falu Zhengyi Yu Lifa Yuanze Jianyi, You 
Guominka Tanqi (IC⌉ㅱ䓐䘬㱽⼳䇕嬘冯䩳㱽⍇⇯⺢嬘炻䓙⚳㮹⌉婯崟) [The Disputes on the Use of 
the IC Cards and the Proposal for Legislative Principles, Smart IC Cards as a Starting Point], 5(1) ZIXUN 
ANQUAN TONGXUN (屯妲⬱ℐ忂妲) [COMMUNICATIONS OF THE CCISA] 88 (Dec. 1998). 
101 See Cin Meihua (䦎伶厗), Ange Zhiwen Shi Qinfan Sheme Renquan? Hexian You Yilu, Baomi Shi
Wenhao (㊱ᾳ㊯䲳㗗Ὕ䉗Ṩ湤Ṣ㪲烎⎰ㅚ㚱䔹ㄖ炻ᾅ⭮㗗⓷嘇) [What Kinds of Human Rights Are 
Infringed by Being Fingerprinted? Concerns of Constitutionality and Doubts of Data Security], 952 XIN 
XINWEN (㕘㕘倆) [THE JOURNALIST] 15 (Jun. 2005).
102 The Human Rights Council is an agency under the President’s office that drafts annual human 
rights protections reports, researches the latest international human rights treaties, and provides related 
consultation.  See generally HUMAN RIGHTS IN TAIWAN, http://www.humanrights.moj.gov.tw/mp205.html
(last visited Feb. 20, 2016).
103 See Lü Xiulian Hong An Zhiwen Weixian (⏪䥨咖弇㊱㊯䲳忽ㅚ) [Vice President Lu: Requiring 
Fingerprinting Is Unconstitutional], PINGGUO JISHI XINWEN (喳㝄㖍⟙) [APPLE DAILY] (May 18, 2005), 
http://www.appledaily.com.tw/appledaily/article/headline/20050518/1785697/.
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the Household Registration Act because of the infringement on human 
dignity, privacy rights, principles of proportionality, legal reservation, and 
due process of law. Section Two of Article Eight provided that “[w]hile 
applying for an ROC identity card pursuant to the preceding paragraph, the 
applicant shall be fingerprinted for record keeping; provided that no national 
who is under fourteen years of age will be fingerprinted until he or she 
reaches fourteen years of age, at which time he or she shall then be 
fingerprinted for record keeping.”104 Section Three declared that “[n]o ROC 
identity card will be issued unless the applicant is fingerprinted pursuant to 
the preceding paragraph.”105 Thus, the revisions clearly require all citizens
fourteen or older to submit their fingerprints via applying for new ID Card.   
4. The Final Attempts to Repeal in the Legislature 
Responding to these controversies, in 2005 several legislative 
members of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (㮹忚源 ) (DPP),
attempted to repeal Sections Two and Three of Article Eight of the 
Household Registration Act. However, the attempts to repeal the Sections 
were soon frustrated in the procedure committee of the Legislative Yuan,
because of resistance from the government, members of conservative 
opposition parties,106 and strong supports from the public.107 Hence, on June 
6, 2005, eighty-five legislators initiated a petition for a constitutional 
interpretation and preliminary injunction,108 claiming that Article Eight of 
the Household Registration Act violated Articles Twenty-Two 109 and 
104 Household Registration Act, supra note 89.
105 Id. 
106 See 94 LIFAYUAN GONGBAO NO.28, (䩳㱽昊℔⟙ 94⌟ 28㛇) [LEGIS. YUAN OFFICIAL GAZ.], at
319 (2005); 94 LIFAYUAN GONGBAO NO. 40, (䩳㱽昊℔⟙ 94⌟ 40㛇) [LEGIS. YUAN OFFICIAL GAZ.], at
290 (2005).
107 See Liu Jhi-yuan (∱⽿⍇), Da Faguan Guandian–Zhuanfa Guifan Zhiwen Dang-an (⣏㱽⭀奨溆-
⮰㱽夷䭬㊯䲳㨼㟰) [Chief Justices: Fingerprint Data Should Be Regulated by Special Laws], ZIYOU 
SHIBAO (冒䓙㗪⟙) [LIBERTY TIMES] (Jul. 2, 2005), http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/paper/23727/print 
(according to a TVBS survey poll on Aug. 9, 2001, 71% of the survey responders support government 
collection of the fingerprint and building up of the central database to ensure the public security.  On May 
13, 2005, 74% of the responders supported such policy.  Under the survey poll from the Interior Ministry, 
83% of the responders supported such a policy).
108 See Lifa Weiyuan Laiqingde Deng 85 Ren Jiu Huji Fa Dì Ba Tiao You Weixian Yiyi Shengqing
Jieshian (䩳㱽⥼⒉岜㶭⽟䫱 85 Ṣ⯙㇞䯵㱽䫔ℓ㡅㚱忽ㅚ䔹佑倚婳妋慳㟰 ) [Petition for the 
Interpretation of the Constitution Involving Article 8 of the Household Registration Act by Legislator Lai 
Qingde and 84 other Legislators], ROC JUDICIAL YUAN, http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt
/P03_01_detail.asp?expno=603&showtype=%AC%DB%C3%F6%AA%FE%A5%F3 (last visited Feb. 20, 
2016) (official website of the ROC Judicial Yuan).
109 MINGUO XIANFA, art. 22 (Taiwan) (“All other freedoms and rights of the people that are not 
detrimental to social order or public welfare shall be guaranteed under the Constitution.”).
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Twenty-Three110 of the ROC Constitution for its infringement of the right to
privacy, right to autonomous control of information, violation of the 
principles of proportionality, legal reservation, and due process of law.
D. Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 603
1. The Recognition of Information Privacy Rights as a Constitutional 
Right
Privacy rights were neither naturally developed by Taiwanese society 
nor enumerated in the ROC’s constitutional law. Instead, the concept of 
individual privacy rights was a new species of human rights transplanted 
from the Western world in the 1980s. The concept of privacy rights
gradually influenced Taiwanese judicial decisions in tort cases in the 1990s,
and resulted in amendments to Taiwanese criminal law to protect intrusions 
of individual privacy.111
The Constitutional Court initially recognized privacy rights as a 
constitutional right in 1992, in the context of protecting bank customers’ 
confidential information from disclosure to the city council.112 Thereafter, 
the Constitutional Court also recognized privacy rights in cases involving
conflicts between defamatory libel and freedom of speech,113 the limits of 
110 Id. art. 23 (“All the freedoms and rights enumerated in the preceding Articles shall not be 
restricted by law except by such as may be necessary to prevent infringement upon the freedoms of other 
persons, to avert an imminent crisis, to maintain social order or to advance public welfare.”).
111 See WONG YUE-SHENG (佩ⱛ䓇) ET AL., ZIXUN LIFA ZHI YANJIU (屯妲䩳㱽ᷳ䞼䨞) [A STUDY ON 
LEGISLATING INFORMATION] (Research Development and Evaluation Commission ed., 1985); LIU JIANG-
BIN (∱㰇⼔), ZIXUN FA LUN (屯妲㱽婾) [DISCUSSION ON INFORMATION LAW] (1986) (the right to privacy 
was initially introduced to Taiwanese society by legal scholars in the 1980s.  Most of these scholars earned 
their law doctoral degree in the United States or the Federal Republic of Germany.).
112 See SIFAYUAN DA FAGUAN HUIYI JIESHI DI 293 HAO (⎠㱽昊⣏㱽⭀㚫嬘妋慳䫔 293 嘇) [The 
Judicial Yuan No. 293 Interpretation], 1992, SIFAYUAN DAFAGUAN HUIYI (⎠㱽昊⣏㱽⭀㚫嬘) [Council 
of Grand Justices:  constitutional court], (SHIZI 1992) (Taiwan).  The Taipei city council attempted to 
enforce its power to investigate the bad debts in 1992.  In order to protect the customers’ privacy, the state-
owned bank declined the motion from the city council.  Thereafter, the city council petitioned the 
Constitutional Court to review the case.   
113 See SIFAYUAN DA FAGUAN HUIYI JIESHI DI 509 HAO (⎠㱽昊⣏㱽⭀㚫嬘妋慳䫔 509 嘇) [The 
Judicial Yuan No. 509 Interpretation] 2000, SIFAYUAN DAFAGUAN HUIYI (⎠㱽昊⣏㱽⭀㚫嬘) [Council of 
Grand Justices:  constitutional court] (SHIZI 2000) (Taiwan).
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police power on search and seizures, 114 and the limits of legislative 
investigative power.115   
In the dispute over issuing National ID Cards requiring citizens to be 
fingerprinted (hereinafter the fingerprint case), the Constitutional Court 
followed judicial trends and expanded protection of privacy rights. In 
Interpretation No. 603, the Court provided, 
Regard[ing] the self-control of personal information, . . . to
guarantee that the people have the right to decide whether or 
not to disclose their personal information, . . . to what extent, at 
what time, in what manner and to what people such information 
will be disclosed. It is also designed to guarantee that the 
people have the right to know and control how their personal 
information will be used, as well as the right to correct any 
inaccurate entries contained in their information.116
The Constitutional Court not only reaffirmed privacy rights as a 
constitutional right protected by the ROC constitutional law, but also 
clarified its policy rationale, stating the importance of “preserving human 
dignity, individuality and moral integrity, as well as preventing invasions of 
personal privacy and maintaining self-determination of personal 
information.” 117 Accordingly, the Court extended the protected zone of 
114 See SIFAYUAN DA FAGUAN HUIYI JIESHI DI 535 HAO (⎠㱽昊⣏㱽⭀㚫嬘妋慳䫔 535嘇) [The 
Judicial Yuan No. 535 Interpretation] 2001, SIFAYUAN DAFAGUAN HUIYI (⎠㱽昊⣏㱽⭀㚫嬘) [Council of 
Grand Justices:  constitutional court] (SHIZI 2001) (Taiwan).
115 See SIFAYUAN DA FAGUAN HUIYI JIESHI DI 585 HAO (⎠㱽昊⣏㱽⭀㚫嬘妋慳䫔 585嘇) [The 
Judicial Yuan No. 585 Interpretation] 2004, SIFAYUAN DAFAGUAN HUIYI (⎠㱽昊⣏㱽⭀㚫嬘) [Council of 
Grand Justices:  constitutional court] (SHIZI 2004) (Taiwan) [hereinafter SHIZI No. 585]. (This was the first 
time the Taiwanese constitutional court mentioned the concept of information privacy rights.  Although the 
court in SHIZI No. 585 did not make a clear outer sketch of the information privacy rights, it paved the way 
for SHIZI No. 603).  
116 SHIZI no. 603, supra note 59. See also LI CHEN-SHAN (㛶暯Ⱉ), RENXING ZUNYAN YU RENQUAN 
BAOZHANG (Ṣ⿏⮲♜冯Ṣ㪲ᾅ晄) [THE HUMAN DIGNITY AND THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS] 275–
318 (2001); ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967) (indicating that “privacy is . . . to determine 
for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others.”  Westin 
seemed to argue people have the right to control their personal information ); DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 332–36 (2d ed. 1997) (in 
Germany, the principle of informational self-control is inferred from Article 1(1) and Article 2(1) of the 
Basic Law).  Based on the delayed development of the concept of right to privacy in Taiwan, the Taiwanese 
Constitutional Court referred to these two foreign concepts and attempted to form a new practical standard 
for the information privacy rights.
117 SHIZI no. 603, supra note 59.
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privacy rights by declaring a general principle: self-determination of
personal information.118
2. The Paradigm Shift of Information Privacy Rights?
After affirming the right of privacy and declaring a general principle 
of personal information protection, the Constitutional Court then faced the 
debate of the paradigm shift of the privacy rights in the information age.
Conventionally, the right of privacy is protected under the “secrecy 
paradigm,” which means there is no claim to privacy when information 
appears in public.119 However, since justices from both sides could not form 
a majority coalition,120 the majority of the Constitutional Court kept silent on
the following issues:  whether the secrecy paradigm should be abandoned,
and whether the right to privacy should be redefined beyond the 
characteristics of secrecy or sensitivity.121
The Court did conclude that fingerprints fell within the scope of 
protected privacy rights because fingerprints are “in a key position to 
opening the complete file of a person by means of cross-checking the 
fingerprints stored in the database.”122 The Court also recognized the right 
of privacy not only prevented invasion of private space, but also “maintained
self-determination of personal information.” 123 As for this dispute, the 
concurring Justice Lin argued that, in the information age, as technology has 
advanced, the totality of information aggregates together, which leads to the 
possibility of establishing a digital biography or digital personal profile via 
118 See id. (Yu-shiu Hsu, J., concurring) (姙䌱䥨⣏㱽⭀⋼⎴シ夳㚠). See also Hsiang-yang Hsieh, 
Locating the Value of Information Privacy in a Democratic Society: A Study of the Information Privacy 
Jurisprudence of Taiwan’s Constitutional Court, 7(1) NAT’L TAIWAN U.L. REV. 293, 309 (2012) 
(commenting on this rationale).
119 See Perkey v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 42 Cal. 3d 185, 191 (1986); Daniel J. Solove, Access and 
Aggregation: Privacy, Public Records, and the Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1177 (2002).
120 SIFA YUAN DA FAGUAN SHENLI ANJIAN FA (⎠㱽昊⣏㱽⭀⮑䎮㟰ẞ㱽 ) [CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION PROCEDURE ACT] art.  14 (1993) (Taiwan) (requiring that a majority of two-thirds of the 
Justices present at a session having a quorum of two-thirds of total number of the Justices for passing an 
interpretation of the Constitution.  However, only more than one-half of the Justices present at the same 
session is required for declaring a regulation or ordinance unconstitutional).
121 See SHIZI no. 603, supra note 59 (Tzu-Yi Lin, J., concurring) (㜿⫸₨⣏㱽⭀⋼⎴シ夳㚠); 
SIFAYUAN DA FAGUAN HUIYI JIESHI DI 689 HAO (⎠㱽昊⣏㱽⭀㚫嬘妋慳䫔 689嘇) [The Judicial Yuan 
No. 689 Interpretation] 2011, SIFAYUAN DAFAGUAN HUIYI (⎠㱽昊⣏㱽⭀㚫嬘) [Council of Grand 
Justices:  constitutional court] (SHIZI 2011) (Taiwan) [hereinafter SHIZI No. 689]. Although the court in 
SHIZI no. 603 failed to completely move away from the secrecy paradigm, the court ultimately moved 
forward from the secrecy paradigm six years later in SHIZI no. 689.
122 SHIZI no. 603, supra note 59 (reasoning). 
123 SHIZI no. 603, supra note 59.
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processing non-secret information.124 Because of these social changes, the 
traditional dichotomy between public and private information has blurred,
and judicial thinking should move away from the secrecy paradigm.125 Thus, 
Justice Lin regarded fingerprints as highly sensitive information and argued
for the application of strict scrutiny, rather than the majority’s intermediate 
scrutiny.126
In contrast to Justice Lin, the dissenting Justice Yu referred to Perkey
v. Department of Motor Vehicles127 as well as Whalen v. Roe,128 and argued
for applying the conventional secrecy paradigm. 129 She argued that the 
fingerprints remaining on tangible objects were public and neutral 
information similar to an individual’s facial appearance, photograph, or 
name. The fingerprints did not reveal the personal prior history, political 
ideology, medical records, or financial situation of an individual. Based on 
the characteristics of fingerprints, Justice Yu viewed fingerprints as low-
sensitivity information, and argued for rational basis scrutiny.130
3. The Legislative Purposes
In the process of constitutional interpretation, the Justices not only 
articulated the protected rights, but also tried to identify and consider 
government interests.131 As for the government’s interests in this case, the 
legislative reasoning132 of the amended Household Registration Act did not
124 See SHIZI no. 603, supra note 59 (Tzu-Yi Lin, J., concurring) (㜿⫸₨⣏㱽⭀⋼⎴シ夳㚠).
125 Id.
126 In SHIZI No. 578, Justice Hsu introduced three levels of judicial review: rational basis, 
intermediate, and strict scrutiny. SIFAYUAN DA FAGUAN HUIYI JIESHI DI 689 HAO (ྖἲ㝔኱ἲᐁ᭳㆟ゎ
㔚➨ 578⹰) [The Judicial Yuan No. 578 Interpretation] 2004, SIFAYUAN DAFAGUAN HUIYI (ྖἲ㝔኱ἲ
ᐁ᭳㆟) [Council of Grand Justices: constitutional court] (SHIZI May 21, 2004) (Taiwan) (Tzong-Li Hsu, J., 
concurring) (チ᐀ຊ኱ἲᐁ༠ྠពぢ᭩ ).  In order to pass the intermediate scrutiny, the law or 
administrative order should further important government interests by substantially related means.  But the 
burden of proof is controversial among Taiwanese Justices.  See Jou-juo Chu, Global Constitutionalism 
and Judicial Activism in Taiwan, 38 J. CONTEMP. ASIA 515, 516 (2008); Dennis T.C. Tang, Judicial Review 
and Transition of Authoritarianism in Taiwan, in CHANGE OF AN AUTHORITARIAN REGIME: TAIWAN IN THE 
POST-MARITAL LAW ERA 439–70 (Institute of Taiwan History, Academia Sinica ed., 2001).
127 Perkey, 42 Cal.3d at 187 (holding that “fingerprinting alone does not improperly infringe on an 
individual’s right of privacy.”).
128 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977).
129 See SHIZI no. 603, supra note 59 (Syue-ming Yu, J., dissenting) (ἁ暒㖶⣏㱽⭀ᶵ⎴シ夳㚠).
130 Id.
131 SHIZI no. 603, supra note 59. 
132 See 85 LIFAYUAN GONGBAO no. 65, (䩳㱽昊℔⟙ 85 ⌟ 65 㛇), (VOL. 2887–3) [LEGIS. YUAN 
OFFICIAL GAZ.], at 350–68, 374–78 (1996); 86 LIFAYUAN GONGBAO NO. 21, (VOL. 2913–1), (䩳㱽昊℔⟙
86⌟ 21㛇 2913嘇ᶲℲ), [LEGIS. YUAN OFFICIAL GAZ.], at 115 (1997).
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specify the government’s purposes. 133 In the oral debate procedure, the 
Ministry of the Interior claimed that there were three functions of the Act: to
verify personal identity; to identify stray people, roadside patients, 
feebleminded senior citizens, and unidentified corpses; and to prevent false 
claim of another’s identity card. 134 While the officials of the Ministry 
denied that the amendment was aimed at preventing crime, the oral debates 
in the Constitutional Court still focused on the issue pertaining to 
fingerprints and crime prevention.
i. Crime Prevention Objectives
After reviewing the legislative records and government proposals, the Court 
recognized that Article Eight of the Household Registration Act was 
amended in pursuit of the de facto interest of crime prevention.135 Then the 
Court rejected the constitutionality of crime prevention as a permissible 
purpose of the amendment because amendments to the Household 
Registration Act may not serve criminal justice purposes after the police 
system and household registration system were separated in 1992.  Justice 
Lin was also concerned about the effects of slippery slope and panopticon.136
As a result, in the digital age, the government might extend its power to an 
un-precedented level without fair notice via monitor and data aggregation 
and restoration technology, leading to a diminished individual right to 
privacy.
133 See id; SHIZI no. 603, supra note 59. (“The failure of the Household Registration Act to specify 
the purpose thereof is already inconsistent with the constitutional intent to protect the people’s right of 
information privacy.”).
134 See id.
135 See 85 LIFAYUAN GONGBAO no. 65 (VOL. 2887–3) (䩳㱽昊℔⟙ 85⌟ 65㛇 2887嘇ᶳ) [LEGIS.
YUAN OFFICIAL GAZ.], at 350–68, 374–78 (1996); 86 LIFAYUAN GONGBAO NO. 21 (VOL. 2913–1), (䩳㱽昊
℔⟙ 86⌟ 21㛇 2913嘇ᶲℲ), [LEGIS. YUAN OFFICIAL GAZ.], at 115; SHIZI no. 603, supra note 59 (1997).
136 See SHIZI no. 603, supra note 59 (Tzu-Yi Lin, J., concurring).  The design of the panopticon,
proposed by Jeremy Bentham, is a circular building with an observing room in the center surrounded by an 
outer wall, containing cells for inmates.  This design would enhance security by facilitating effective
surveillance.  This architectural design is to allow inmates to be observed by a supervisor.  The inmates are 
not capable of telling whether they are observed or not.  However, Michel Foucault criticized this concept 
and it became a metaphor for the modern disciplinary mechanism and anonymous power.  See MICHEL 
FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 195–228 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage 
Books 2d ed. 1995).
256 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 25 NO. 2
 
ii. Objectives to Verify Identity or to Identify Stray People, Roadside 
Patients, Feebleminded Senior Citizens, and Unidentified Corpses, or 
to Prevent False Claims of Another’s Identity Card
After rejecting the constitutionality of the implicit crime prevention 
objective, the Court also refused to uphold other explicit objectives raised by 
the Ministry of the Interior. Regarding the objective of “verifying identity” 
and “the prevention of false use of the national ID cards,” the majority 
censured the government for its failure to show any reliable statistics or data 
to establish the claimed interests, and was concerned about the substantial 
risk of data leakage due to the lack of adequate precautionary measures.137
Moreover, the majority also determined that the goal of anti-counterfeiting
might be substantially achieved by installing other anti-counterfeit measures 
in the National ID Card without collecting fingerprints. With respect to the 
legislative purpose of “identifying stray imbeciles, roadside unconscious 
patients, psychotic invalids and unidentified corpses,” 138 the Court also 
viewed collecting fingerprints as unnecessary because such nationals were 
already unidentified or hard to identify.139
V. THE FOLLOW-UP EFFECTS OF THE FINGERPRINT CASE AND NEW 
CHALLENGES TO THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY: IS DEMOCRACY THE MAJOR 
HINDRANCE TO THE PRIVACY RIGHTS?
A. Divergent Thoughts Within Taiwanese Society
The fingerprint case in 2005 clearly exposed the cleavage in 
Taiwanese society about personal information, privacy rights, social order, 
and state power. The controversy itself meant that, under the wave of 
democratization and digital revolution, some people, including legal scholars 
in the official Human Rights Council under the President’s office and human 
rights organizations, were fully aware of the threats of expanding 
government power via collecting fingerprints and building up a central 
national database in the name of crime prevention. 140 Conversely, the
137 SHIZI no. 603, supra note 59 (“[T]he competent authority shall engage in the aforesaid collection 
in a manner that is sufficient to ensure the accuracy and safety of the information, and take any and all 
necessary protective measures both organizationally and procedurally as to the files of fingerprints so 
collected so as to be in line with the constitutional intent to protect the people’s right of information 
privacy.”).
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 See Liu Ching-yi (∱朄⿉), Shuwei Shidai Jiben Renquan de Sifa Dingwei: Lijing Yichang Xianfa 
Fating de Bianlun Zhihou (㔠ỵ㗪ẋ➢㛔Ṣ㪲䘬⎠㱽⭂ỵ烉㬟䴻ᶨ⟜ㅚ㱽㱽⹕䘬彗婾ᷳ⼴) [The 
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dispute also reflected the tendencies of most Taiwanese people still under 
the shadow of authoritarian ruling. As a result of being trapped by the 
experience of “good social order,” most Taiwanese people agreed to 
sacrifice their privacy in exchange for the social order promised by the 
government. They still embraced the government’s ability to collect 
personal information in the name of maintaining social order.
1. Legal Profession and Human Right Activists
In the late twentieth century, a limited number of Taiwanese citizens 
were aware of issues relating to the value of individual privacy rights, strong 
constitutionalism, and the risks of expanding government power without 
adequate restrictions. In the 1980s, the introduction of Western 
constructions of privacy rights and personal information protection from 
legal scholars who studied abroad offered opportunities for intellectuals to 
reevaluate the separation of public and private, emphasize the basic value of 
constitutional rights and encourage the separation of power. Those scholars
argued for more protection of personal information, most likely because they 
were naturally liberal and tended to support broader protection, and were 
reinforced by citations to foreign scholars’ opinions that leaned toward
strong protection.141 These ideas of promoting human rights and distrusting 
authoritarian government gradually spread to the public along with social 
movements for democracy in the late 1980s and the early 1990s.
The increasing awareness of privacy rights ultimately reached a
critical mass of human rights activists, including lawyers, scholars, and 
NGO workers, giving rise to a series of social movements beginning in the 
late 1990s.142 The movements against the smart IC cards in 1998 further 
drew public attention and caused more citizens to view governmental power 
critically143.
Jurisprudence of Fundamental Rights in the Digital Era: After a Debate in the Constitutional Court],
https://www.jrf.org.tw/newjrf/rte/myform_detail2.asp?id=1038.
141 See WONG YUE-SHENG (佩ⱛ䓇) ET AL., ZIXUN LIFA ZHI YANJIU (屯妲䩳㱽ᷳ䞼䨞) [A STUDY ON 
LEGISLATING INFORMATION LAW] (Research Dev. and Evaluation Commission ed., 1985); LIU JIANG-BIN 
(∱㰇⼔), ZIXUN FA LUN (屯妲㱽婾) [DISCUSSION ON INFORMATION LAW] (1986).
142 See Liu Ching-yi (∱朄⿉), Ruguo, Gezi Waixie Jiashang Zhiwen (⤪㝄炻ᾳ屯⢾㳑≈ᶲ㊯䲳) [In 
Case of Leakage of Personal Information and Fingerprints], [LIANHE BAO] (倗⎰⟙) [UNITED DAILY 
NEWS] (June 3, 2004), available at http://intermargins.net/Forum/2001%20July-
Dec/privacy/nation/na07.htm
143 See supra Part IV.C. 
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In 2000, the long-term opposition party DPP and its nominee Shui-
bian Chen campaigned and won on a human rights platform. Chen 
completed the first peaceful political transition in Taiwanese history.
Subsequently, human rights advocates gained opportunities to hold public 
office as Human Rights Council members or Justices, leading to an
ideological and jurisprudential shift within the judicial branch. Thereafter, 
the Court played a more active role in scrutinizing the legislative process
and the claimed public interests.
As controversy surrounding the fingerprint case rose in 2005, the
DPP-ruling government insisted on enforcing the new National ID Cards
policy.144 Members of the DPP and human rights advocates were deeply 
split on this issue.145 On the one hand, some DPP legislators, most Human 
Rights Council members (including Vice President Lu), most legal 
scholars,146 and human rights organizations strongly disputed the legitimacy 
of expanding the government’s power. Thus, eighty-five DPP legislative 
members initiated a petition for constitutional interpretation. 147 In the 
opening arguments, four of five amici curiae pointed out the essentiality of 
the household registration system and the National ID Card.148 However,
they all recognized the widespread criticism of the new National ID Card 
policy of collecting fingerprints without offering specific objectives or 
adequate restrictions. The newly-appointed Justices promptly responded to 
the alarm. The court suspended the application of Article 8 of the 
144 Premier’s Resolutions from Executive Yuan Meetings No. 2941, supra note 98.
145 See Guomin Zheng & Hu Lizong (悕㓷㓧&傉䩳⬿), An Zhiwen Zhengyi Bian Yun Chong 
Renquan (㊱㊯䲳䇕嬘 ㇩⃩慵Ṣ㪲) [President Chen Promised to Respect Human Rights About the 
Fingerprints Case], PINGGUO JISHI XINWEN ( 喳 㝄 㖍 ⟙ ) [APPLE DAILY] (May 17, 2005),
http://www.appledaily.com.tw/appledaily/article/headline/20050517/1783465/ ; Chiu Hei-yuan (䝧㴟㸸), 
Cuoluan de Zhengfu—/΃QJ6Kenfen Zheng An Zhiwen de Zhengce Wenti (拗Ḫ䘬㓧⹄—柀幓ấ嫱㊱㊯䲳
䘬㓧䫾⓷柴) [The Disordered Government: the Public Policy Issues on the Government’s Collection of 
Fingerprints], MINZHONG RIBAO ( 㮹 䛦 㖍 ⟙ ) [THE COMMONS DAILY] (Aug. 8, 2005), 
http://www.ios.sinica.edu.tw/hyc/ index.php?p=columnID&id=64
146 Chien Yeong-Shyang et al., supra note 87.
147 Petition for the Interpretation of the Constitution, supra note 108.
148 See Li Chien-liang (㛶⺢列), [Huji Fa Dibatiao An Zhiwen Guiding Shixian An Jianding Yijian 
Shu] (㇞䯵㱽䫔ℓ㡅㌢㊯䲳夷⭂慳ㅚ㟰揹⭂シ夳㚠) [Amicus Brief on Constitutional Interpretation of 
Article 8 of the Household Registration Act], 73 TAIWAN BENTU FAXUE ZAZHI (⎘䀋㛔⛇㱽⬠暄娴)
[TAIWAN L.J.] 38–56 (2005); Yen Chueh-An (柷⍍⬱), Huji Fa Dibatiao An Zhiwen Guiding Shixian An 
Jianding Yijian Shu (㇞䯵㱽䫔ℓ㡅㌢㊯䲳夷⭂慳ㅚ㟰揹⭂シ夳㚠) [Amicus Brief on Constitutional 
Interpretation of Article 8 of the Household Registration Act], 79 TAIWAN BENTU FAXUE ZAZHI (⎘䀋㛔⛇
㱽⬠暄娴) [TAIWAN L.J.] 145–77 (2006); Syu Jheng-Rong (⼸㬋ㆶ), Huji Fa Dibatiao An Zhiwen Guiding 
Shixian An Jianding Yijian Shu (㇞䯵㱽䫔ℓ㡅㌢㊯䲳夷⭂慳ㅚ㟰揹⭂シ夳㚠) [Amicus Brief on 
Constitutional Interpretation of Article 8 of the Household Registration Act], 75 TAIWAN BENTU FAXUE 
ZAZHI (⎘䀋㛔⛇㱽⬠暄娴) [TAIWAN L.J.] 57–81 (2005).
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Household Registration Act by issuing a preliminary injunction, 149 then
struck down the core provisions authorizing the government to collect 
fingerprints.150
On the other hand, some legal scholars, 151 and DPP legislators 152
supported the President, either in support of the myth of maintaining social 
order or economic development in order to gain political capital. These
voices showed that the value of privacy rights was not firmly rooted in the 
minds of most political intellectuals.  Even though most DPP politicians had 
undergone undue surveillance by the authoritarian government, the 
unconscious goal of pursuing social order still convinced them that 
maintaining social order or improving policy makers’ capability to promote 
the general welfare might outweigh the value of the privacy rights. This 
support for the fingerprint requirement suggests that intellectuals and 
politicians are not reliable protectors of these rights if there is no broad
public support for the value of privacy rights and awareness of the risks of 
biometric technologies.
2. The Majority of People: Unawareness of Right to Privacy
The fingerprint case hinted that broad public support would be 
required to protect privacy rights. However, the case also demonstrated that 
most Taiwanese people were still under the shadow of the authoritarian 
ruling, and desired a strong government to maintain social order or promote 
general welfare.153 Moreover, compared to the risks of violent criminals, the 
149 See SIFAYUAN DA FAGUAN HUIYI JIESHI DI 599 HAO (⎠㱽昊⣏㱽⭀㚫嬘妋慳䫔 599嘇) [The 
Judicial Yuan No. 599 Interpretation], 2005 SIFAYUAN DAFAGUAN HUIYI (⎠㱽昊⣏㱽⭀㚫嬘) [Council of 
Grand Justices:  constitutional court] 2005, (SHIZI 2005) (Taiwan).
150 See SHIZI no. 603, supra note 59.
151 Liu Zhiyuan (๽ᚿཎ), Shixian Shuoming Hui Zhiwen Jiandang Zhengce Guoban Zhichi (㔚᠇茢
᫂᭳ᣦ⣠ᘓ᷐ᨻ⟇㐣༙ᨭᣢ) [The Majority of People Support Being Fingerprinted], ZIYOU SHIBAO (⮬
⏤᫬ሗ) [LIBERTY TIMES] (July 1, 2005), http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/focus/paper/23612 (statement of 
Professor Meng Hsien-Hui in Liu Chih-yuan).
152 Li Shinfang炷㛶㫋剛), Huan shenfen zheng chaoye xieshang yao na zhiwwn (㎃幓↮嫱㛅慶⋼⓮
天㌢㊯䲳) [The Congressional Cross-Party Negotiation Still Required People to Submit Their Fingerprints 
for New National ID Cards], ZIYOU SHIBAO ( 冒 䓙 㗪 ⟙ ) [LIBERTY TIMES] (May 22, 2004),
http://old.ltn.com.tw/2004/new/may/22/today-p5.htm
153 See Wu Nai-teh (⏛ᷫ⽟), Zhuanxing Zhengyi He Lishi Jiyi:  Taiwan Minzhuhua de Weijing zhi 
Ye (廱✳㬋佑␴㬟⎚姀ㅞ: ⎘䀋㮹ᷣ⊾䘬㛒䪇ᷳ㤕) [Transitional Justice and Historical Memory: The 
Undone Works in Taiwan Democracy], 2 SIXIANG ( ⿅ ゛ ) [REFLECTION Q.] 1, 21 (2005), 
http://www.ios.sinica.edu.tw/ios/people/personal/wnd/廱✳㬋佑␴㬟⎚姀ㅞ.pdf [hereinafter Wu Nai-teh, 
Transitional Justice and Historical Memory] (in 2003, based on a survey poll from Academic Sinica, 46% 
of survey responders still cherished the authoritarian ruling and viewed it as a better political system for 
Taiwan).
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public failed to fully understand the complexity of biometric technologies 
and their risks. Those combined factors caused the public154 to easily accept 
official propaganda campaigning for the accuracy of biometric verification, 
and ignore the risk on the technology of verification and storage.155 Two
months after the fingerprint case decision, a survey poll conducted by the 
Sociology Department of Academic Sinica showed a contradiction: while 
more than 55% of responders were concerned or seriously concerned about 
the threat of the government’s collecting personal information, more than 
68.5% responders still agreed to submit their biological features to promote 
the social order.156
This contradiction presented an important crossroad in the political 
consciousness of the Taiwanese people. As democracy came in the 1990s, 
the government’s history of human rights infringements was disclosed.157
As a result, the public no longer trusted the police to collect any personal 
information to build up its central database. However, the public was 
constrained by their memory, and cherished the perception of overall social 
order. 158 Hence, although the public was concerned about the abuse of 
government power and the risk of data leakage, the value of the privacy 
rights was still unconsciously subject to abstract public interests:  social 
order and administrative efficiency.
154 Based on a survey poll from Liberty Times on July 1, 2005, 79% of survey responders agreed or 
strongly agreed to submitting their fingerprints to set up a national database.  See Chou Kuei-tien (␐㟪䓘), 
Quanqiu Zaidihua Fengxian Dianfan zhi Chongtu—Shengwu Tezheng Bianshi Zuowei Quanqiu de Laolong 
(ℐ䎫⛐⛘⊾桐晒℠䭬ᷳ堅䨩—䓇䈑䈡⽝彐嬀ἄ䁢ℐ䎫䘬䈊䰈 ) [“Glocalized” Conflict in Risk 
Paradigm–Recognition of Biological Characteristics as a Global Iron Cage], 24 ZHENGZHI YU SHEHUI 
ZHEXUE PINGLUN (㓧㱣冯䣦㚫⒚⬠姽婾) [SOCIETAS: A J. FOR PHIL. STUDY OF PUB. AFF.] 101–89 
(2008) (indicating that the fingerprint case revealed two competing paradigms of risk perception: simple 
modern and reflexive modern).  
155 See id. 
156 Id. at 165 (this survey poll showed that after a series of social movements and the constitutional 
interpretation, around 10% of responders changed their attitudes toward the collection of fingerprints.  
However, around 70% of responders still chose to agree with this policy.).    
157 THE MEMORIAL FOUNDATION OF 228 [ḴḴℓḳẞ䲨⾝➢慹㚫], ER-ERBA SHIJIAN ZEREN GUISHU
YANJIU BAOGAO (ḴḴℓḳẞ屔ả㬠Ⱄ䞼䨞⟙⏲ ) [RESEARCH REPORT ON RESPONSIBILITY OF 228
MASSACRES] (2006), http://issuu.com/naiweicheng/docs/228-01?e=5196527/2643089 (the online version is 
available on the official website of the Memorial Foundation of 228).
158 Wu Naiteh (⏛ᷫ⽟), Reformer or Dictator? Reassessing the Role of Chiang Ching-guo in the 
Democratic Transition (⚆ㅞ哋䴻⚳炻㆟⾝哋䴻⚳), in GUOSHI GUAN (⚳⎚棐) [ACADEMIA HISTORICA],
ERSHI SHIJI TAIWAN MINZHU FAZHAN (Ḵ ⋩ ᶾ䲨 ⎘䀋 㮹ᷣ 䘤⯽ ) [TAIWANESE DEMOCRATIC 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE 20TH CENTURY] 467 (2004).
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3. The Revision of the Personal Information Protection Act and the DNA 
Sampling Act
The top-down judicial ruling in the fingerprint case and its inspiring 
words have not substantially changed the public’s mind nor the legislature’s 
attitudes towards the individual right to privacy. In the fingerprint case of 
2005, human rights organizations and the Constitutional Court forced an 
amendment to the Household Registration Act and prohibited the 
government from broadly expanding its power to collect, process, and use 
personal information without specifying its purpose. In addition to the 
amendment of the Household Registration Act, the fingerprint case also 
urged the legislators to amend other laws to reflect the spirit of Interpretation 
No. 603.
In 2010, the legislature materially revised the content of the 
Computer- Processed Personal Data Protection Law and changed its title to
the Personal Information Protection Act.159 At first glance, the new law 
ultimately corresponded to the social needs in the information age and 
substantially broadened its coverage to all personal information, rather than
just “computer processing information.”160 Additionally, the law included
special provisions on sensitive personal information to prevent the 
government’s unnecessary collection or processing.161 However, after close 
examination, the language was neither clear nor sufficiently limiting and 
may grant wide discretion to the government agency, leading to an over or 
under-inclusive interpretation of the scope of specific purpose or exception 
to collect, process,162 or use163 the personal information.
159 Geren Ziliao Baohufa (ᾳṢ屯㕁ᾅ嬟㱽) [Personal Information Protection Act] (2010).
160 See 97 LIFAYUAN GONGBAO NO. 28 (VOL. 3639), (䩳㱽昊℔⟙ 97⌟ 28㛇 3639嘇) [LEGIS. YUAN 
OFFICIAL GAZ.], at 212–52 (2008); 97 LIFAYUAN GONGBAO NO. 48 (NO. 3659–1), (䩳㱽昊℔⟙ 97⌟ 48㛇
3659嘇ᶲ) [LEGIS. YUAN OFFICIAL GAZ.], at 114–218 (2008).
161 GEREN ZILIAO BAOHUFA (ᾳṢ屯㕁ᾅ嬟㱽) [PERSONAL INFORMATION PROTECTION ACT], art. 6 
(personal information concerning medical treatment, genetic information, sexual activity, health 
examination, and criminal record should not be collected, processed, or used).
162 Id. art.  15 (the government agency should not collect or process personal information unless there 
is a specific purpose and should satisfy one of the following conditions:  1) it is necessary to carry out the 
duties prescribed by laws and regulations;  2) the Party has consented;  or 3) the rights and interests of the 
Party will not be harmed).
163 Id. art. 16 (the information may be used outside the scope upon the occurrence of one of the 
following conditions:  1) where prescribed by law;  2) where it is necessary for national security or the 
promotion of public interests;  3) where it is to prevent significant harm to the life, body, freedom, or 
property of the Party;  4) where it is to prevent harm to the rights and interests of other people;  5) it is 
necessary for the government agency or an academic research institution to conduct statistical or academic 
research based on public interest, respectively.  The information may not lead to the identification of a 
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The DNA Sampling Act also demonstrates the public and legislature
lacked concern about the privacy rights of criminal suspects.164 In 1999, 
based on the same social background of the amendment of the Household 
Registration Act, the legislature enacted the DNA Sampling Act to authorize 
prosecutors or judges to collect, identify, analyze, and store DNA samples of
suspects or those accused of violent felonies or sex crimes. Under this law, 
prosecutors were neither required to receive a search warrant for the DNA
samples, nor adequately restricted from storing or analyzing the remaining
data. Following the revision of 2012, based on public anxiety over rising
crime and the development of technology to analyze and store DNA samples,
the legislature dramatically increased the scope of those subject to 
mandatory DNA sampling, expanding the list of crimes beyond violent 
felonies and sex crimes to an astonishingly long list without considering its 
necessity and the potential threat to the right to privacy.165
B. The Reason for the Gap: The Public Unawareness and Its Historical 
Context
Historically, Taiwanese people have obediently accepted the 
authority’s rules for pursuing social order and economic development.
Privacy rights have not yet been embedded into Taiwanese culture. Based 
on the long-accepted methods of government surveillance and limited 
opportunities to learn about constitutionalism, most Taiwanese are 
certain person after the treatment of the provider or the disclosure of the collector;  6) where such use may 
benefit the Party; or 7) the Party has consented).
164 Quyang Hetang Hesuan Caiyang Tiaoli (⍣㯏㟠態㟠愠㍉㧋㡅ἳ) [DNA Sampling Act] (1999).
165 Id. at art. 5 (those accused or suspected of committing any of the following offenses shall be 
subject to mandatory DNA sampling:  1) offenses against public safety as provided in paragraph 1 and 3 of 
Article 173, paragraph 1, 2, and 4 of Article 174, and paragraph 1 of Article 175 of the Criminal Code of 
the Republic of China; 2) sexual offenses as provided in Articles 221 to 227, 228, and 229 of the Criminal 
Code of the Republic of China. 3) offenses of homicide as provided in Article 271 of the Criminal Code of 
the Republic of China; 4) offenses of causing injury as provided in paragraph 2 of Article 277 and Article 
278 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of China; 5) offenses of abrupt taking, robbery and piracy as 
provided in paragraph 2 of Article 325 and Articles 326 to 334–1 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of 
China; 6) offenses of extortion and kidnapping for ransom as provided in the Criminal Code of the 
Republic of China.  The accused or suspects who are convicted of any of the following offenses and 
recommit any offenses provided in this paragraph shall be subject to mandatory DNA sampling: 1) offenses 
against public safety as provided in paragraph 1 and 4 of Article 183, paragraph 1, 2, and 5 of Article 184, 
Article 185-1, Article 186, paragraph 1, 2, and 4 of Article 186-1, Article 187, 187-1, 188, paragraph 1, 2, 
and 5 of Article 189, paragraph 1, 2, and 4 of Article 190, Article 191-1, and any intentional offense against 
Article 176 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of China; 2) offenses against freedom as provided in 
Article 296, 296-1, and 302 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of China; 3) offenses of larceny as 
provided in Article 321 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of China; 4) offenses of abrupt taking, 
robbery and piracy as provided in paragraph 1 of Article 325 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of 
China; 5) offenses as provided in Article 7, 8, 12, and 13 of the Firearms, Ammunition and Knives Control 
Act; and 6) offenses as provided in Article 4 to 8, 10 and 12 of the Narcotic Control Act).
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accustomed to complying with the government’s rules and are willing to 
overlook the risk of disclosing their personal information to authorities.
With the end of the National Mobilization in Suppression of 
Communist Rebellion and the revival of the constitutional order in the 1990s, 
Taiwanese society underwent a transitional period from the previous
authoritarian regime to a democratic system, and fell into a restless and 
perplexed situation. The acceptance of constitutional rights and democracy 
gradually spread among citizens via a series of social movements. On the 
one hand, intellectuals had opportunities to access more information than 
ever without censorship because of attendant relaxing of restrictions. The 
digital revolution also changed the landscape of communication, facilitating 
the transmission of all sorts of ideas into Taiwan. Those changes allowed 
the ideas of human rights and constitutionalism to be introduced to the 
Taiwanese public much more easily, and as a result these ideas enlightened
some scholars and led them to actively advocate for the value of human 
rights and democracy. Because of the numerous social movements and the 
development of democracy, many citizens were awakened and started 
assembling together to fight for their rights.
On the other hand, with the dramatic political and social changes, the 
public perceived the old social order to be ruined. However, it was not 
immediately replaced with a new social norm, causing most people 
accustomed to relying on the authority of the government to feel awkward 
and confused. The retreat of government intervention and the growth in the 
power of the mafia and big corporations increased the perception of disorder, 
resulting in a pervading collective anxiousness. Under this collective fear 
for personal safety, a flagrant criminal incident on the TV screen would 
easily trigger a massive response from the public.  Furthermore, most 
citizens had limited awareness due to long-term censorship,166 and instead
cherished social order, demanding the government to expand its power.
This divide was not drawn simply along categories of race, class, age,
or gender. Instead, the divergence was based on different personal life 
166 See Lin Qi Yang (㜿㵯㾩), Zhan Hou Taiwan Bao Jin Zhengce zhi Xingcheng (㇘⼴冢䀋⟙䤩㓧
䫾ᷳ⼊ㆸ) [The Formation of Post-War Policy on Newspaper Restrictions in Taiwan], 85 TAIWAN XUE 
TONGXUN (⎘䀋⬠忂妲 ) [TAIWAN SCI. COMM.] 20, 20–21 (2015), http://www.ntl.edu.tw/public/
Attachment/512910151526.pdf (the ROC government claimed to save paper resources and carried out the 
policy of restricting newspaper licensing and its issuance amount from May 20, 1949 to Jan. 1, 1988).
264 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 25 NO. 2
 
experiences, memories, 167 and perceptions of the risks 168 of unintended 
consequences.169 In a democratic society, diverse views with all possible 
variations were common and usual. But Taiwanese society was still under 
the shadow of its authoritarian ruling history170 and held different viewpoints 
on important political issues like the 228 Incident,171 and the subsequent
government suppression.172 Moreover, although the National Mobilization 
for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion period ended more than two 
decades prior, bureaucrats were still used to the practices in use during that 
span. As a result, the government focused on administrative efficiency and 
scientific assessment of risk, rather than full disclosure of the implicated 
risks as well as cost to the public to form a new public consensus. This
delayed disclosure of risks from the government broadened the gap between 
both sides. 173 The complexity of privacy rights in Taiwanese society is 
rooted in the tension between the historic background and administrative 
structure and the recent rise of constitutionalism and privacy rights.174
167 See, e.g., Jeffrey K. Olick & Joyce Robbins, Social Memory Studies:  From Collective Memory to 
the Historical Sociology of Mnemonic Practices, 24 ANNU. REV. SOCIOL. 105 (1998);  see also Chen Wei-
Hong (昛䏳泣), Renquan, Zhengti Zhuanxing yu Jiyi Zhengzhi: Yige Zhuanxing Zhengyi Zhijiao de Jiantao
(Ṣ㪲ˣ㓧橼廱✳冯姀ㅞ㓧㱣ᶨᾳ廱✳㬋佑夾奺䘬㩊妶) [Human Rights, Transition of Regime, and 
Politics of Memory: An Examination of Transitional Justice Perspectives], [40 SOCIETAS: A J. FOR PHIL.
STUDY OF PUB. AFF.] 95 (2012).
168 See e.g., ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY: TOWARDS A NEW MODERNITY (1992).
169 The unintended consequences include, but are not limited to, the risk of incidental data leakage, 
the abuse of government power, and the reinforcement of stereotypes.   
170 See e.g., Wu Nai-teh (⏛ᷫ⽟ ), Transition Without Justice or Justice Without History:  
Transitional Justice in Taiwan, 1 TAIWAN J. DEMOCRACY 77 (2005), http://www.ios.sinica.edu.tw/ios/
people/personal/wnd/ TransitionWithoutJusticeOrJusticeWithoutHistory.pdf.
171 The 228 Incident was initially a protest in Taipei against police abuse of power, starting on 
February 27 1947.  The protest then spread widely to the whole island and became a popular uprising 
against public corruption and economic mismanagement.  However, the ROC government violently 
suppressed the uprising in March.  The number of deaths was estimated to be between 18,000 and 28,000.  
After the incident, the ROC government declared martial law, leading to the disappearance, death, or 
imprisonment without a fair trial of thousands people during the following forty years.  See WAKABAYASHI 
MASAHIRO (劍㜿㬋ᶰ), ZHANHOU TAIWANSHI (㇘⼴⎘䀋⎚) [THE HISTORY OF POSTWAR TAIWAN] 11, 57 
(1994); Tillman Durdin, Formosa Killings Are Put at 10,000, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 1947),
http://www.taiwandc.org/hst-1947.htm.
172 This spanned from May 18, 1949 to July 14, 1987.  As estimated, 29,407 Taiwanese were accused 
of treason and imprisoned without a fair trial.  Around 4,500 persons were secretly executed for their 
alleged dissent against the government.  See RESEARCH REPORT ON RESPONSIBILITY OF 228 MASSACRES,
supra note 157; WAKABAYASHI MASAHIRO, supra note 171, at 103.
173 Chou Kuie-tien & Chang Chun-mei, supra note 80.
174 See Wu Nai-teh, Transitional Justice and Historical Memory, supra note 153, at 21.
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C. An Unanswered Question: Democracy and Privacy
As the fingerprint case showed, in Taiwanese practical experience the 
tension between information privacy rights and democracy175 by majority 
rule in a post-authoritarian society is not easily resolved. It also indicated 
that judicial independence, rather than democracy, played the role of being 
the final protector of privacy rights.  A decade after the fingerprint case, this 
article examines several questions. First, whether without thorough public 
awareness of the value of privacy rights, will Taiwanese people always 
expect the judicial branch to play an active role, limiting the legislative 
power and resisting the public yearn for social order? Second, in the modern 
information society, will the marriage of computer technology and 
democracy further erode and diminish the protected zone of privacy rights? 
Finally, without rigorous and complete personal information protection laws,
how will Taiwanese society ensure that individuals’ freedom will not be
destroyed by state surveillance or community intimation?176 In order to 
resolve these questions, we should closely observe the spread of the valuing
of privacy rights and constitutionalism among the general populace in 
Taiwan, and the judicial branch’s future attitudes towards the evolution of 
privacy rights in the information age.
VI. CONCLUSION  
Since the late nineteenth century, Japan and ROC have adopted
distinct legal systems governing personal information in Taiwan. Although 
Taiwan transformed its political regime into democracy in the 1990s, the 
memory of authoritarian rule and good social order still shapes the public’s
expectation of the governmental function.  This historic and social 
background substantially postponed the rise of constitutionalism and privacy 
rights taking root in the Taiwanese society. As a result, most Taiwanese 
people still expect the government to promote the general welfare and guard 
175 In the United States, a similar debate focused rather on the tension between an open government 
and information privacy rights.  See Wallace Parks, Open Government Principle:  Applying the Right to 
Know Under the Constitution, 26 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 3 (1957).  The debate also focused on the free 
flow of information and information privacy.  See Richard A.  Posner, An Economic Theory of Privacy, in
PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 337–38 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed., 
1984);  Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a 
Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1050–51 (2000).
176 See Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Participation:  Personal Information and Public Sector 
Regulation in the United States, 80 IOWA L. REV. 553, 563 (1995);  Danielle Keats Citron, Fulfilling 
Government 2.0’s Promise with Robust Privacy Protections, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 822, 842–43 (2010);  
Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 
1423–28 (2000).
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the social order, and then tend to re-invite the government to expand its 
power without adequate restrictions. Moreover, as the government 
dramatically expands its capability to collect, store, and process the personal 
information in the information age, the issue of individual privacy rights 
faces a new urgent challenge.
These social changes shaped the divergent views on privacy rights 
within the Taiwanese society. On the one hand, some legal professions and 
human rights activists began to cautiously contemplate the role, power, and 
capacity of the government in governing personal information.  On the other 
hand, being influenced by their past experience, the majority of Taiwanese 
people opted to subject their privacy rights to the government without
considering the likelihood of the government’s abuse of its power in 
collecting or processing personal information. The fingerprint case revealed
these conflicting values within modern Taiwanese society. This case 
demonstrated that even though Taiwan has successfully transformed its 
political regime into democracy and finished the peaceful political transition,
its history and memory still influence the public choice and constrain the 
evolution of the privacy rights.
